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INTRODUCTION
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of
treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race,
color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as
possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes
1
without impairing efficiency or morale.

With the issuance of Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948, President Harry
Truman, in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces,
2
effectively signaled the racial integration of the United States military. While
3
this blow to racial segregation was not without enemies, the Order was
ultimately followed without crippling, defiant opposition, and it became a
harbinger for increased civil rights for people of color, inside and outside the
4
military.

1. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948) (requiring the integration of Blacks
into the Armed Forces).
2. While Blacks served in the military prior to 1948, they were segregated from Whites, and
they were limited in their enlistment numbers and the job fields they could enter. See MARTIN BINKIN
ET AL., BLACKS AND THE MILITARY 18 (1982) (noting that in the years that followed World War I,
Blacks were not allowed to enlist in the Marine Corps and Air Corps, were limited to a quota equal
to their population number in the Army, and were limited to serving as messmen (stewards) in the
Navy).
3. At the time the Order was issued, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower opined, “I do believe that . . .
by passing a lot of laws to force someone to like someone, we will get into trouble . . . [because
racism is an] incontrovertible fact.” Gary Bass, Their Words: Discrimination, 1948 and 1993, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1993, at 15. In March 1949, the Secretary of the Army testified before Congress
that the equality of treatment and opportunity would fail because black troops were less capable
than white troops. Peter J. Gomes, Going Back In the Military Closet: Generals Carried the Day by
Harnessing Fears of Change, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL STAR TRIBUNE, June 1, 1993, at 13A (discussing
also the point that integration of the military constituted an insult to Southern Whites, who would
not accept Blacks as their equals). See also Kenneth Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation
of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 520–21 (1991) (discussing Pres. Truman’s military
integration Order and describing the Army as resistant to the policy); Richard A. Posner, Against
Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1998) (noting that the successful integration of the
military with regard to gender and race was achieved largely through civilian initiatives over
military objections); RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Chapter 1: Sexual Orientation
and U.S. Military Personnel Policy: Policy Options and Assessment, in POTENTIAL INSIGHTS FROM
ANALOGOUS SITUATIONS: INTEGRATING BLACKS INTO THE U.S. MILITARY 166–70 (1993), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR323/mr323.ch1.pdf
[hereinafter
RAND
SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY] (indicating that while the decision was unpopular, Pres. Truman had
the support of key civilian and military personnel including: Sec. of the Navy (and later Sec. of
Defense), James Forrestal; Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest King; the Deputy Chief of Staff
for the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Idwal Edwards; and the Sec. of the Air Force, Stuart Symington).
4. As one court has stated: “Before Brown v. Board of Education and in the days of Jim Crow
segregation, in the early 1950’s, the military instituted relatively successful integration throughout its
ranks. This success helped to support national integration policies in later years.” Hill v. Berkman,
635 F. Supp. 1228, 1237 (E.D.N.Y 1986) (citing JACK GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND THE AMERICAN
LAW 369 (1950), and J. SLONAKER, THE U.S. ARMY AND THE NEGRO vi (1971)).
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With regard to race, and increasingly with regard to gender, the military
5
experiment in social engineering has been heralded generally as a great success.
The central point of this Article is to question whether the praise afforded this
success story is truly warranted and to explore a disjuncture that may exist
between this positive narrative and the lived experiences of service members.
Given the number of minorities, in particular African Americans, who have
6
used the military to improve their life conditions, it is with some reluctance that
this Article criticizes the praise that has been accorded the organization for its
7
success at including minorities. This Article will suggest, however, that
although the Armed Forces have done much to alleviate the effects of racial
discrimination and subordination within the Services, some important work
remains to be done with regard to managing opportunities for service members
across myriad identities. In particular, attention needs to be paid to the unique
challenges that face service members disadvantaged along multiple dimensions
8
of difference, such as women of color. Consequently, this Article seeks to
interrogate the continued viability of an integration success narrative where
there exists disconfirming evidence and in an environment where the most
significant challenges to minorities are related neither to bare inclusion nor mere
elimination of instances of overt discrimination.
Specifically, this Article argues that the military services, like many

5. See Charles Moskos, How Do They Do It?: The Army’s Integration Success Story, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 5, 1991, at 16–20. For the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005, the race statistics for
the military active duty and Coast Guard force of 1,413,182 were as follows: Whites, 64.4% (910,783);
Blacks, 17.4% (246,255); Hispanics, 9.0% (127,052); Asian-American and Pacific Islanders, 4.6%
(64,844); American Indian/Alaskan, 1.8% (24,737); and Multi-racial/Unknown, 2.8% (39,541).
ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND U.S. COAST GUARD FY 2005, at
2 [hereinafter ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE].
6. In one discussion of the benefits of military service, the following representative claim has
been made: “The mechanisms by which military service can alter the status of young [B]lacks who
have been isolated from the mainstream of American life are part of a ‘bridging environment,’ in
which the individual acquires new skills and abilities to help him in his civilian career.” BINKIN ET
AL., supra note 2, at 72 (footnote omitted; alteration added); Moskos, supra note 5, at 20. In the interest
of full disclosure, I would have to include myself within the group of individuals described here.
The United States Navy, through an NROTC scholarship, substantially contributed to my
undergraduate education and paid, through its Law Education Program, nearly the entire cost of my
law school education.
7. Throughout the remainder of the Article this predominant narrative of the military’s success
at racial inclusion is referred to as an “integration success story.” Notably, variants of this specific
phrase have been used in the work of other scholars to describe the Army’s integration record. See
Moskos, supra note 5; CHARLES MOSKOS & JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, Success Story—With Caveats, in ALL
THAT YOU CAN BE: BLACK LEADERSHIP AND RACIAL INTEGRATION THE ARMY WAY 1, 1–2 (1996).
8. For the foundational analyses of the structural and legal consequences of inhabiting
multiple identity categories, see Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex,
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139, 140 (discussing the concept of intersectionality—that multiple bases for subordination
intersect in formulations of an individual’s identity and experiences) [hereinafter Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection]; Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) [hereinafter Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins].
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institutions, must grapple with problems related to unconscious bias, which
Professor Lu-In Wang has recently described as “unconscious cognitive and
motivational biases that lead us reflexively to categorize, perceive, interpret the
behavior of, remember, and interact with people of different groups
10
differently.” Belief in the continued veracity of an unchanging narrative of
successful integration undermines a commitment to uncovering and solving
such problems. By dislodging the story and acknowledging the effects of
unconscious bias, the Armed Forces will be better able to address the ways in
which some use identity—race in particular—as a tool to stigmatize, dishonor,
11
and disfavor group members based on their perceived characteristics. As it
currently stands, the operation of unconscious biases interacts with Armed
Forces’ institutional policy choices—such as a commitment to formal equality
achieved through race- and gender-neutral regulations—and organizational
12
social norms to negatively shape the work “performance” of women and
minority service members. Performance, then, which serves the dual function of
measuring skills competence and reflecting assimilative conduct, becomes the
basis to limit the promotion and retention prospects of these same groups.
This Article critiques the current state of integration within the military
through an analysis of the ways in which identity markers such as race and
gender still matter. To that end, the Article applies theories related to the social
13
construction of identity, to explore and reveal how women and people of color

9. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (noting that individuals acquire and use racial
attitudes and stereotypes without knowing it); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1489 (2005) (analyzing psychology studies indicating that subjects performed tasks with unconscious
racial bias); Linda Hamilton Kreiger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1203 (1995) (noting that once
individuals rely upon stereotypes to explain societal differences, the stereotypes become an
unacknowledged but engrained part of their cognitive processes).
10. LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 9 (2006). Prof.
Wang further offers, “These unconscious biases, in turn, can lead us to treat people differently based
on irrelevant characteristics without intending to or even being aware that we are doing so.” Id.
11. See R. A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 803, 809–10 (2004) (analyzing the work of Erving Goffman and Glen Loury in her proposal that
racial stigma is a “problem of negative social meanings”).
12. Here, performance pertains both to job- or service-specific conduct and the concept of
performing one’s identity. See Angela P. Harris, Love and Architecture: Race, Nation, and Gender
Performances Inside and Outside the State, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 121 (2005) (discussing Devon Carbado
and Mitu Gulati’s scholarship on performance identity, and variations of the concept); John O.
Calmore, Whiteness as Audition and Blackness as Performance: Status Protest from the Margin, 18 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 101 (2005) (discussing the performative aspects of race and describing race as “sets of
behaviors that [one] could choose to act out, as expectations they had of themselves and others, as
physical difference and as ethnicity and subculture.”) (alteration added). Identity performance in the
military is discussed in Part III.A, infra.
13. With regard to the social construction of identity categories, see KWAME A. APPIAH, THE
ETHICS OF IDENTITY 21–23, 65–71 (2005) (noting that identity is formed through individual and
collective dimensions, which serve to label or identify groups whose behaviors then are filtered
through social conceptions, such as stereotypes); Kwame A. Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of
Identity, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 55, 68
(Robert C. Post et al. eds., 2001) (“For a social identity is, among other things, a set of normative
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must still manage the effects of identity stereotypes, even within an organization
that has been heralded as a model for successful inclusion. The Article suggests
how, without an organizational commitment to meaningful identity-conscious
policies, the essentially required identity performances of women, people of
color, and gays and lesbians prove to be unsatisfying practices to ensure their
success within the military. These circumstances thereby undermine the
strength of any true integration story. Further, it argues that individuals who
inhabit multiple identity categories must engage in greater feats of assimilative
conduct to fit in and might, therefore, be at the most significant disadvantage in
14
terms of promotion and retention within the military. In essence, with regard to
15
the effects of “working” their identities, this Article contends that these
16
individuals must negotiate a contemporary version of a “double bind,” where
17
their differences make it difficult to fit in along white and male social norms,
18
but where assimilative conduct may provide inconsequential relief.
Part I of this Article presents the predominant story of military integration
success for race. Part II, however, suggests the various ways that this success
story is problematic. First, Part II.A asserts that the military’s integration success
generally appears more suspect when analysis is expanded to include gender
integration. While great strides have been made to include women, formal
polices such as the combat exclusion and the existence of informal behavioral
norms tied to masculinity remain barriers to true equality. Shifting from a
discussion of the lesser-included to the totally excluded, Part II.B questions
whether, given the military’s treatment of gays and lesbians, any positive
integration narrative(s) should be regarded as credible. This discussion is
scripts for shaping your behavior, your plans, your life.”). On the concept of race and gender as
socially constructed, see D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82
GEO. L.J. 437, 439–40 (1993) (“But race, for all its rhetorical power, is an incoherent fiction. . . . Racial
categories are neither objective nor natural, but ideological and constructed.”) and JUDITH BUTLER,
GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990) (decoupling gender from sex
and describing gender not as innate, but as socially negotiated and constructed through language).
14. Analysis of some promotion data, suggesting how little attention is paid to tracking the
promotion opportunities of women of color, is presented in Part III.B, infra.
15. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1279–1308
(2000) (describing how persons of color and women “work” or modify presentations of identity to
undermine or emphasize stereotypes in the workplace).
16. See Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and The Double Bind: The Illusory
Choice of Motherhood, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 7–16 (2005) (discussing the double bind as a
heightened “Catch-22,” or situation always fraught with paradox and advancing a place for the use
of double bind theory within legal theory).
17. These norms are discussed in Part III.A, infra. See also Billie Mitchell, The Creation of Army
Officers and the Gender Lie: Betty Grable or Frankenstein, in IT’S OUR MILITARY, TOO!: WOMEN IN THE
U.S. MILITARY 35, 37 (Judith Hicks Steihm ed., 1996) [hereinafter IT’S OUR MILITARY TOO!]
(“Astonishingly, military women voluntarily put up with a subculture . . . of misogyny [that]
routinely manifests itself in harassment, if not physical violence, toward women.”) (alteration
added).
18. This is the position in which plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, famously found herself with regard to
her job performance at Price Waterhouse. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions
require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they
behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.”).
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concluded in Part II.C, where it is argued that the success reported in the
integration narratives of race, and to a lesser extent gender, may be waning
largely because of the various Armed Forces gravitating toward color- and
gender-blind approaches to promotion and retention. These approaches came in
to prominent use as a result of a set of reverse discrimination cases. Adopting
these approaches not only undermines the success story, but also contributes to
the conditions that create the need for extra identity work for service members
inhabiting multiple identity categories.
Part III seeks to explicate with greater nuance the dangers of accepting the
prevailing positive narrative for the current state of military identity inclusion.
This Part argues that greater focus should be placed on rooting out behavioral
barriers to promotion and retention, rather than measuring success based
merely on entry statistics. In Part III.A, given the military’s current embrace of
gender- and race-neutrality, theories of unconscious bias and identity
performance are advanced to explore the individual challenges that face women
and minority service members. In particular, it is argued that in the absence of
meaningful race- and gender-conscious regulations, people of color and women
face difficulties in managing identity against the backdrop of the unspoken
requirements of the military’s unique work culture. Using primarily the work of
legal scholars Kenji Yoshino, Devon Carbado, and Mitu Gulati, it is argued that
19
20
minorities are largely reduced to “covering” (downplaying) and “working”
their identities in order to limit the effects of white and male social norms and
the greater challenges unique to the military. In theory, to the extent these
assimilative plays undermine negative race and gender stereotypes, they should
lead to some measure of success. Part III.A asserts, however, that within the
military, in the absence of a true commitment to assessing the cost of difference,
assimilative conduct is not an effective solution for overcoming debilitated
status identity. This is especially true for those considered multiply deviant, and
for whom the amount of difference that must be mitigated creates a greater
burden. For all, however, in an environment that lawfully limits opportunities
based on gender and sexuality, it is doubtful that behavioral norms will be
confronted, where they merely reinforce stereotypical understandings of
identity.
Part III.B shifts from considering individual to institutional conduct and
queries whether the previous story of inclusiveness based upon race continues
to be persuasive in light of recent data detailing minority promotion
opportunities. Unlike studies that focus on the current membership numbers for
21
women and people of color within the military to measure integration success,

19. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L. J. 769 (2002).
20. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 15, at 1268–70.
21. Many persons who comment on the race and gender integration of the military do so in
terms of the numbers of minorities and women within the enlisted and officer ranks of the various
services. See, e.g., Mary F. Katzenstein & Judith Reppy, Introduction: Rethinking Military Culture, in
BEYOND ZERO TOLERANCE: DISCRIMINATION IN MILITARY CULTURE 1, 10 (Mary F. Katzenstein &
Judith Reppy eds., 1999) [hereinafter BEYOND ZERO] (noting that 1998 Department of Defense (DoD)
and Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) statistics indicate a steady increase
of black officers over the past twenty-five years).
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the focus here is placed on selected promotion statistics. For racial minorities
and women, these statistics reveal a sporadically troubling landscape with
regard to opportunities for success. While the data cannot be used to make
broad empirical claims, they do help to expose a problem that was instrumental
to the genesis of this Article: the problem that for certain persons for whom
there are multiple bases to discriminate, statistics are not maintained. For
instance, that the promotion board statistics considered do not present one with
an opportunity even to assess the specific success of women of color is
symptomatic of a type of problem that is referenced in the title of this Article.
The phrase, “But Some of [Them] Are Brave” is a reference to a well-known
Black Women’s Studies text, which emphasizes how the specific issues of
women of color are often obscured by greater focus being placed on men of
22
color and white women. Moreover, while the data do not definitively prove the
utter falseness of military integration success, they do suggest—in the least—
23
that it may be premature to shift institutional policies toward colorblindness.
Finally, Part IV discusses a return to regulations and guidance that more
concretely consider the ways race and gender factor into promotions and
retention. It locates the potential availability of such considerations in the case
law considering military equal opportunity initiatives, the deference the courts
historically have afforded to the military, and the Supreme Court’s specific
endorsement of the diversity rationale in education as a means to keep the
military integrated. A return to identity-consciousness is needed because
currently it is individuals who largely bear the burden of mitigating the
consequences of difference within the military. A more progressive military—
one committed to substantive equality and integration premised upon success
rather than access—should, however, also bear a portion of this burden.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that an organization that turns a blind eye to
these types of constraints and demands on identity must either give up its
claims with regard to the success of its program of integration or move toward

22. ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, THE BLACKS ARE ALL MEN, BUT SOME OF US ARE BRAVE: BLACK
WOMEN’S STUDIES xxi (Gloria Hull, Patricia Bell Scott & Barbara Smith eds., 1982) [hereinafter ALL
THE WOMEN]. This phenomenon is criticized in the scholarship on intersectionality. See generally
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection, supra note 8; Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 8.
For an example of an article questioning the applicability of intersectional theories and analysis to
the military, see Gwendolyn M. Hall, Intersectionality: A Necessary Consideration for Women of Color in
the Military?, in BEYOND ZERO, supra note 21, at 143–61. The phrase, “But Some of [Them] are Brave,”
however, seemed an appropriate title for multiple reasons. Not only does it capture the notion that
the concerns of women of color may be overlooked within the military, but it also serves as an
effective criticism of the combat exclusion policies, which limit the service of women who wish to be
fully integrated into the Armed Forces. These policies are discussed in detail in Part II.A, infra.
23. While colorblindness in this context refers to the choice not to consider or “see” race when
making institutional decisions, this practice has been criticized as problematic. See Jerome McCristal
Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as
Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 166–69 (1994) (criticizing jurisprudence claiming colorblindness
is a moral imperative, and opining that instead it is a policy choice for maintaining a hierarchical
“racial status quo”); Gary Peller, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3
(1991) (noting that, in a system marked by racial subordination, “[a] color-blind interpretation of the
constitution legitimates, and thereby maintains, the social, economic, and political advantages that
[W]hites hold over other Americans”) (alteration added).
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policies that disavow the muted weight of difference that still exists for some
within the ranks.
I. RACIAL INCLUSION AND THE FORMATION OF AN “INTEGRATION SUCCESS STORY”
As recently as 2003, in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v.
24
Bollinger, we have seen national recognition extended to the military’s
25
successful integration of its forces with regard to race. In fact, the Court’s
decision to allow public colleges and universities to continue to consider racial
diversity in admissions was based in part on the vital role such admissions play
in producing a pool from which to draw military officer candidates. In an
amicus brief, military leaders claimed that maintaining a racially diverse officer
26
corps was not merely preferred but vital to national security. The Grutter case
reveals the ultimate power of law—and of society accepting the military as an
integration success. As a precursor to analyzing the dangers of accepting the
narrative as accurate, this Part of the Article considers how this success narrative
emerged. It does so by looking at the history of military race relations and
marking the military’s transformation from an organization that practiced
explicit racial exclusion to one understood to be a model for racial inclusiveness.
27
While the government’s motives may not have been pure, from the time
28
President Truman issued Executive Order 9981, the decision to open the
29
military to African Americans has had far reaching implications within society.
Still, the road toward solidifying the racial integration mandated in the
Executive Order was long and winding. In addition to requiring integration, the
Order created the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and
30
Opportunity (the Fahy Committee), which worked to encourage full
24. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
25. For a claim that the military is an institution that defines values for the country, including
values pertaining to race relations, see Diane H. Mazur, Why Progressives Lost the War When they Lost
the Draft, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 563–64 (2003).
26. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331.
27. At the time he issued Executive Order 9981, President Truman was under significant
pressure from black leaders and civil rights organizations, and had the forces not been integrated,
they would have experienced logistical and tactical difficulties maintaining segregated forces during
the Korean War. Black Participation in American Society, in A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY 50, 70 (Gerald Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989) [hereinafter A
COMMON DESTINY]. See also Mazur, supra note 25, at 586 (“The military’s success, relative to the
civilian world, in fostering healthy race relations deserves credit. However, it should also be noted
that the military failed to make a moral commitment to better race relations until the need for
minority volunteers after the end of the draft made racial inclusiveness a functional imperative, not
just a moral imperative.”); RAND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 169 (discussing how
Korean War personnel shortages forced the Army to move forward with meaningful integration).
28. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
29. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 27, at 71 (“The military by 1965 was in front of the private
sector in many of the changes it had made. . . . The military prefigured later changes being fought for
on the civilian front.”); Karst, supra note 3, at 522 (“The racial integration of the services, however, is
only part of a much larger story . . . . The larger story is the way myriad black men and women over
the past half century have claimed their places as equal citizens.”)
30. BINKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 26. It was the Fahy Committee, in 1950, which worked with
the services and the Department of Defense to reach an agreement, “at least in principle, on plans for
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integration, even as the President informally agreed to allow Service Secretaries
31
to continue to limit enlistments by race. The Fahy Committee was followed in
1962 by the President’s Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces
32
(the Gesell Committee). It was the circumstances described in the Gesell
33
Committee report, along with a history of race and gender integration
problems, which created an environment in need of race-conscious policies.
According to military historian Charles Moskos, racial tensions came to a
head during the Vietnam Era:
Throughout the Vietnam War race relations were terrible. By the early 1970s
race riots were rampant, an outcome of both perceived and real discrimination
against [B]lacks in the military along with spillover from the racial and political
turmoil in society at large. Racial conflict did not disappear with the allvolunteer Army, instituted in 1973. Fights between black and white soldiers
34
were endemic in the 1970s, an era that is now called “the time of troubles.”

Following the unrest in this era, the military made a significant
35
commitment to fixing its race problem. It did so by creating race-conscious
36
structural mechanisms to ensure equality. Race, then, became a consideration
for admitting officers into the service academies and Reserve Officer Training
37
Corps (ROTC) programs. Through the creation of the Defense Equal

eliminating the formal, legal structure of racial segregation and enabling the mixing of [B]lacks and
[W]hites in the same military units.” RAND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 164
(citation omitted; alterations added).
31. BINKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 27.
32. Id. at 31.
33. The Gesell Committee discovered “an unbalanced grade distribution of [B]lacks in the
services, segregation (or only token integration) and exclusionary practices in the National Guard
and the reserves, and racial discrimination on military installations and in surrounding
communities.” Id. at 31–32 (alteration added).
34. Moskos, supra note 5, at 16 (alteration added). See also BINKIN, ET AL., supra note 2, at 35–38
(noting that the Vietnam era was marked by claims of institutional racism and incidents with racial
overtones); Karst, supra note 3, at 521 (“Racial tensions ran high during the Vietnam War, especially
in the Army, which had few black officers and was suffering a general decline in discipline and
morale.”); RAND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 180 (“Between 1968 and 1972, all the
Armed Forces experienced numerous outbreaks of racial hostility and violence in a worldwide
pattern that nearly matched the strife that had existed during World War II.”).
35. See Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Consolidated
Brief], 2003 WL 1787554.
36. For an overview of the affirmative action architecture required by the DoD and applied by
the Army, see Capt. Donovan R. Bigelow, Equal but Separate, Can the Army’s Affirmative Action
Program Survive Judicial Scrutiny After Croson, 131 MIL. L. REV. 147, 157–61 (1991). One example of a
race-conscious policy was the Navy’s “Enhanced Opportunities for Minorities Initiative” of the mid1990s which set a goal to reach an accession level in the Navy and Marine Corps Officer corps of
twelve percent Blacks, twelve percent Hispanics, and five percent other minorities by the year 2005.
See Dep’t of the Navy, 1997 Posture Statement (Feb. 16, 2006), available at http://www.navy.mil/
navydata/policy/fromsea/pos97/pos-pg04.html.
37. Consolidated Brief, supra note 35, at 18–24 (discussing the identity-conscious policies—
including targets and goals—used to ensure opportunities for women and minorities at the service
academies); id. at 25–27 (discussing the same policies for ROTC programs).
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Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI)—the Defense Department’s
institute for equal opportunity training and data collection—the forces began to
38
track the conditions for minorities in myriad contexts, including promotions.
They issued directives that not only required the assessment of equal
39
opportunity at critical junctures, but facilitated the development of tools to
40
ensure equal opportunity in other areas, such as assignments. These policies
were so effective that by the time of the first Persian Gulf War, there were no
41
significant racial incidents reported during the conflict. This is not to say that
anyone believed the military services had entirely eliminated segregation and
42
discrimination, but that unlike other institutions, they had placed a great deal
of effort behind meaningful integration. This has resulted in military scholars
referring to the military—the Army in particular—as an organization that: (1)
43
“contradicts the prevailing race paradigm” ; (2) is “unmatched in its level of
44
racial integration” ; and (3) stands out “even among governmental agencies, as
an organization in which [B]lacks often do better than their white
45
counterparts.” Professor Kenneth Karst restates what is now a common belief
in the following manner: “No one today claims the services are free from the
effects of racism, but on this score it is hard to find any other institution in

38. See Dep’t of Defense Instr. 1350.3, Affirmative Action and Planning and Assessment Process,
§ 4 & encl. 2 (1988) (requiring the services to track equal opportunity statistics for categories such as:
recruiting/accessions, composition, promotions, professional military education, and assignments),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/135003p.pdf. Congress has mandated
that the “Secretary of Defense shall carry out an annual survey to measure the state of racial, ethnic,
and gender issues and discrimination among members of the Armed Forces serving on active
duty . . . .” 10 U.S.C. § 481 (2000). The individual services have also created bureaus and initiatives
separate from DEOMI. For instance, the Army initiated the Commission on Officer Diversity and
Advancement (CODA) to study the underrepresentation of black officers. See LT. COL. ANTHONY D.
REYES, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, MILITARY FELLOW RESEARCH REPORT,
STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR MANAGING DIVERSITY IN THE U.S. ARMY x (June 2006), available at
http://www.jointcenter.org/publications1/publication-PDFs/TonyReyes.pdf. The Navy has
formed the Diversity Directorate within the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, to promulgate
the Navy’s policies on diversity. Id. at 21.
39. Pursuant to policies such as those cited supra at notes 36 and 38, the Services have
developed tools for tracking race and gender numbers for accessions, augmentation/retention, and
separation.
40. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1315.7, Military Personnel Assignments, § 4.1 (2005)
(“Assignments shall be made for all Service members without regard to their color, race, religious
preference (except chaplains), ethnic background, national origin, age, marital status (except for
military couples), or gender (except where prohibited by statute and limitation of facilities)
consistent with requirements for physical capabilities.”), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdf/131507p.pdf.
41. Moskos, supra note 5, at 16.
42. REYES, supra note 38, at 12 (“[I]n 1991, the United States Commission on Civil Rights . . .
found that discrimination still existed in the Army . . . based on low promotion rates among [B]lacks
and apparent problems in the administration of justice.”) (alteration added).
43. MOSKOS & BUTLER, supra note 7, at 1–2 (acknowledging that the Army is not a racial utopia,
but favorably compares to most nonmilitary institutions with regard to racial integration).
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id. at 5–6 (alteration added).
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46

American society that has done better.”
So strong was the belief in the military as a model for effective inclusion
that in his speech encouraging the society to accept a mend to, rather than the
end of, affirmative action within the federal government, President Clinton
stated:
The model used by the military, the army in particular . . . that model has been
especially successful because it emphasizes education and training, ensuring
that it has a wide pool of qualified candidates for every level of promotion. That
approach has given us the most racially diverse and the best qualified military
in history. There are more opportunities for women and minorities there than
47
ever before.

Ultimately, it was the military’s reputation for success at integration through
48
race-conscious means that affected the Court’s decision in Grutter. In that case,
the consolidated amicus brief filed by general officers, senators, and former
secretaries of defense, through historical analysis and data on inclusion,
49
emphatically proclaimed the truth of the military integration success narrative.
Moreover, the amici sought the Court’s assistance in preserving the diverse
officer candidate pool necessary to maintain that success. The military’s concern
did, in fact, become a central factor in the Court maintaining diversity as a
rationale capable of supporting the consideration of race in post-secondary
admissions. Specifically, the Court relied heavily upon the consolidated amicus
brief and indicated: “What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian
leaders of the United States military assert that, ‘[b]ased on [their] decades of
experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to
50
the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.”
The Court went on to adopt the military’s claims that it could not produce a
qualified and diverse officer corps without using “limited race-conscious
recruiting and admissions policies” for the service academies and collegiate
51
ROTC programs. Significantly, the Court agreed with the conclusion reached in
the amicus brief that “‘the country’s other most selective institutions must
52
remain both diverse and selective.’” Essentially, the Court used the brief to
suggest that integration fuels the success of the organization. Given that this
success can only be maintained through a race-conscious accession process, then
it must be okay to also use some version of this type of selection policy for

46. Karst, supra note 3, at 521.
47. President William Clinton, Mend It Don’t End It, Address at the National Archives on
Affirmative Actions Programs (July 1995) (noting also that he had ordered a complete review of all
federal affirmative action programs and using as an example of the success of such programs the
“over fifty generals and admirals who are Hispanic, Asian-, or African-American”) (transcript
available at http://web.utk.edu/~mfitzge1/docs/374/MDE1995.pdf).
48. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
49. Consolidated Brief, supra note 35, at 5.
50. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (O’Connor, J.) (quoting Consolidated Brief, supra note 35, at 27)
(alteration added).
51. Id. (quoting Consolidated Brief, supra note 35, at 5).
52. Id.
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university admissions.
II. INTERROGATING INTEGRATION SUCCESS NARRATIVES
Despite the public’s embrace of the military as a model for integration
success, there remain serious flaws within the model. While, on the one hand,
the Armed Forces have worked hard to create and maintain diversity within
their ranks, they have, on the other hand, explicitly and unabashedly limited the
quality of that service for some members (women) and completely excluded
others (gays and lesbians) from open service. Even if diversity is generally
viewed as imperative to the Services, this Part argues that the disparate
treatment afforded across identity groups creates questions about the extent of
integration success and whether the narrative can be maintained. The limits of
this success story are first tested by looking at how the inclusion of Blacks failed
to spur the successful integration of other minority groups. Based on the
improved opportunities now available to women in the Armed Forces, Part II.A
argues that some support exists for claiming that, with regard to gender, the
military may trumpet another integration success narrative. The strength of this
claim is challenged, however, by exploring the key policies that operate as
longstanding barriers to the equal participation of women—limits on combat
assignments. In Part II.B, the viability of integration success narratives is
challenged by exploring the effects of the continued exclusion of gays and
lesbians from openly serving. Part II.C will explicate how the success narrative
has also been undermined due to policy changes during the Clinton
administration that mandated a move toward colorblindness in officer
promotions. These policy changes were precipitated by attacks on affirmative
action that came through reverse-discrimination lawsuits brought both outside
53
54
of, and from within, the military. Ultimately, these lawsuits resulted in
guidance that provided extremely watered-down versions of equal opportunity
statements to military promotion boards. As opposed to previous statements,
the current statements substantially prevent the military from considering its
55
history of race and gender discrimination in promotions and assignments.

53. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), signaled the beginning of the significant
curtailment of affirmative action programs; the Court held that state and local affirmative action
programs were subject to strict scrutiny and that race-based remedial efforts should be used to
address a present issue, rather than prior history of government discrimination. Shortly thereafter, in
Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Court indicated that federal affirmative action
programs would also be subject to strict scrutiny. This ruling prompted President Clinton to instruct
all federal agencies to evaluate all race-conscious programs.
54. Even though some government programs were able to continue to consider race and gender
in some decisions after Adarand, a federal district court specifically limited the ways race and gender
could be considered by military promotion boards. See Saunders v. White, 191 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D.D.C.
2002) (holding that the written equal opportunity guidance the U.S. Army provided to its 1996 and
1997 Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps Colonel promotion boards was unconstitutional). See
also Christian v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 793 (2000) (ending racial preferences in the way the Army
conducted mandatory retirement boards); Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(ruling on the same matter for Air Force retirement boards), settlement approved by 59 Fed. Cl. 675
(2004).
55. For a discussion of the discrimination that persisted for Blacks, prior to and after
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A. Gender Integration: A Success Story?
While the primary purpose of this Article is to interrogate the strength of
the military’s racial integration success story, some attention must also be paid
to gender, given that later analysis pertains to understanding the effects of
overlapping systems of subordination on military members. Specifically, the
claim is advanced that in the military too little attention is paid to the difficulties
56
that face individuals marked by both race and gender differences. As such, it is
understood that to describe a gender story as separate from the story of race (or
57
sexuality) is to participate somewhat in the very practice criticized herein. With
regard to that gender story, alone, much of the present emphasis is placed on the
58
current numbers for women in the military, the many opportunities available
59
to some women of color, and the improving picture with regard to the
60
availability of combat billets for all women. The history of integrating women
into the military services, however, has not been so rosy. The story of gender
integration has traveled along a similar but modified arc of inclusion when
61
compared to the story of race —or, as one commenter has opined: “By contrast,
equal opportunity for women is also a stated principle, but the role of women

integration, see BINKIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 18–38 (discussing institutional racism in the Forces
during World War II, the Korean Conflict and the Vietnam Conflict); Karst, supra note 3, at 516–21;
RAND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 186–87.
56. See infra Part III.B.
57. This practice not only ignores identity intersections but also inadvertently embraces an
essentialist perspective—that gender and race categories suffice to capture the myriad experiences of
the various diverse members within those groups. For an astute analysis of race and gender
essentialism, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990).
58. At the end of Fiscal Year 2005, women comprised greater than fourteen percent of the
Armed Forces (205,054 women officers and enlisted members of 1,414,182 total personnel); the
percentage of female officers by service and race were as follows: Army 6.1% (58.8% White; 24.6%
Black; 5.9% Hispanic; 0.6% American Indian/Alaskan; 6.5% Asian-American/Pacific Islander; 3.5%
Multi-racial/Unknown); Navy 3.8% (72.9% White; 12.0% Black; 5.6% Hispanic; 0.9% American
Indian/Alaskan; 6.4% Asian-American/Pacific Islander; 2.1% Multi-racial/Unknown); Air Force
6.6% (71.6% White; 12.1% Black; 4.0% Hispanic; 0.7% American Indian/Alaskan; 5.5% AsianAmerican/Pacific Islander; 6.1% Multi-racial/Unknown); Marine Corps 0.5% (64.5% White; 10.0%
Black; 9.4% Hispanic; 1.0% American Indian/Alaskan; 4.3% Asian-American/Pacific Islander; 9.9%
Multi-racial/Unknown); and Coast Guard 0.5% (78.4% White; 7.5% Black; 6.3% Hispanic; 1.2%
American Indian/Alaskan; 0.2% Asian-American/Pacific Islander; 6.4% Multi-racial/Unknown).
ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE, supra note 5, at 2, 8.
59. African-American women make up 28.3% and 9.4% of the enlisted and officer ranks of the
military, respectively. Id. at 10. On the story of the overrepresentation of African American women,
see Brenda L. Moore, From Underrepresentation to Overrepresentation: African American Women, in IT’S
OUR MILITARY TOO!, supra note 17, at 132.
60. See infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
61. See Katzenstein & Reppy, supra note 21, at 5 (discussing the similarities in the race and
gender integration stories: both groups saw their entrance into the services facilitated through
manpower needs associated with war, and each saw their lots improved through performance and
shifting social norms). Cf. id. at 16 (discussing work that points out differences in the race and gender
integration stories but surmising, at bottom, whether the stories will be equally successful will
depend on whether the “constructed identity of the masculine warrior is open to amendment in
response to changes in the broader society”).
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continues to be a rolling source of contention.”
Due to personnel shortages related to the exigencies of war, women were
first allowed to enter the Armed Forces during World War II, as members of the
Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), which was later transformed into the
63
Women’s Army Corps (WAC). The Navy followed in short order, creating the
64
Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES), and the Air
Force formed Women in the Air Force (WAF). Even after these initially
segregated organizations were abandoned pursuant to the installation of a
65
formal policy of full integration of all of the Services, women faced obstacles to
military service. For example, until the late 1960s, women constituted only one
66
percent of the military, and legal challenges had to be asserted to achieve equal
67
benefits. Even as women’s numbers within the forces began to improve
68
throughout the next decade, at least two types of challenges to full integration
remained that will discussed in this Article: (1) that women of color—and
African Americans in particular—have faced and continue to confront
69
additional obstacles related to race; and (2) that the story of gender integration
cannot be argued as a complete success, due to the military’s continued policy

62. Moskos, supra note 5, at 17; RAND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 158
(“Unlike the experience with racial integration . . . the policy message about women has been
ambiguous”). The following description captures the difficult ascendance of women within the all
volunteer force:
The history of women in the military reveals the institutional resistance to integrating
women into this powerful male preserve. For women, the doors have been reluctantly
“pried open” largely as a result of the need for more troops during times of war and
following the adoption of an all-volunteer force.
Valorie K. Vojdik, Beyond Stereotyping in Equal Protection Doctrine: Reframing the Exclusion of Women
from Combat, 57 ALA. L. REV. 303, 325 (2005) (citations omitted).
63. Moore, supra note 59, at 116.
64. Id. at 117.
65. Formal integration was achieved through the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act
(1948). Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62 Stat. 356 (1948). The Act was by no means designed to ensure equal
participation. See Vojdik, supra note 62, at 325 (“The Act capped the number of women in the
military to [two percent] of all enlisted troops. It barred women from serving on aircraft or ships
engaged in combat missions . . . [it] also barred women from serving in a command position; women
could not hold the rank of general or hold permanent rank above lieutenant colonel.”) (citations
omitted; alterations added). Additionally, for years after they were formally integrated, the Services
were permitted to treat women differently from men in enlistment, discharge, dependency benefits,
promotions, and assignment to combat units. See Lucinda Joy Peach, Women in Combat, in IT’S OUR
MILITARY TOO!, supra note 17, at 158 [hereinafter Peach, Women in Combat]; Lucinda J. Peach, Women
At War: The Ethics of Women in Combat, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 199, 201–02 (1994) [hereinafter
Peach, Women at War]. The two percent cap was finally removed through Public Law 90-130 (1967);
Brenda L. Moore, Reflections of Society: The Intersection of Race and Gender in the U.S. Army in World
War II, in BEYOND ZERO, supra note 21, at 141.
66. RAND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 158.
67. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting the military
from providing differential family benefits based on gender).
68. RAND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 159.
69. See IT’S OUR MILITARY TOO!, supra note 17, at 117–23. The special issues that confront women
of color are discussed in Part III.A, infra.
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70

barring the assignment of women to combat units. As the race and gender
intersection matters most specifically relate to constraints on identity
performance, they will be discussed in Part III. This second issue, of course,
finds part of its justification in norms related to the role of women within society
71
and military norms related to masculinity.
While a 1998 GAO report indicates that there have been increases in
72
opportunities, women are still excluded from direct ground combat. The
breadth of the combat exclusion has, however, been waning, with the
prohibitions on women serving on combat vessels and most combat aircraft
73
being lifted in the early nineties. Also, the DoD-wide “no-direct-groundcombat rule” was revised in 1994, after Operation Desert Storm. The rule was
rewritten to only exclude women from “assignments to units below the brigade
74
level whose primary mission is direct ground combat.” The policy also
permitted services to close positions to women for units physically collocated
with direct ground combat units. Direct ground combat is further defined as
engaging “an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons,
while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical
contact with the hostile force’s personnel . . . [that] takes place well forward on
the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire,

70.

See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: INFORMATION ON DOD’S ASSIGNMENT POLICY
DIRECT GROUND COMBAT DEFINITION (1998) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99007.pdf. One military member studying this issue has
suggested that the strategies previously used to limit the service of African Americans, are currently
used to deny women a role in combat. Lt. Col. Henderson Baker, II, Women in Combat: A Culture
Issue 6-7 (Mar. 15, 2006) (unpublished Master’s thesis, U.S. Army War College) (on file with author).
71. Peach, Women at War, supra note 65, at 207 (“Ideological notions about gender operate in the
debate about women in combat to perpetuate not only myths about women, but also about men, the
military and the nature of war and combat. Traditional notions of gender identity link men with war
and women with peace.”); Karst, supra note 3, at 536 (“[W]omen’s relative physical strength and
passivity have little to do with maintaining the combat exclusion. The real concerns are of two kinds:
The first is the special regard for women who must be protected as the symbolic vessel of femininity
and motherhood.”) (alteration added).
72. In 1998, approximately 221,000 of the DoD’s 1.4 million positions (roughly fifteen percent)
were closed to women, who comprised fourteen percent of the Armed Services at the time. By force,
the number of positions closed to women were: 141,950 in the Army (or twenty-nine percent); 43,460
in the Marine Corps (or twenty-five percent); 33,366 in the Navy (or nine percent; of this number,
seventy-seven percent were on submarines and thirteen percent were collocated with Marines); and
2,310 in the Air Force (or less than one percent). GAO REPORT, supra note 70, at 3.
73. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190,
§ 531, 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991) (opening naval aviation to women and repealing 10 U.S.C. § 8549,
which barred women in the Air Force from assignment to “duty in aircraft engaged in combat
missions”); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 541, 107
Stat. 1547, 1659 (1993) (repealing 10 U.S.C. § 6015, which barred women from assignment to “duty
on vessels that are engaged in combat missions (other than as aviation officers as part of an air wing
or other air element assigned to such a vessel)” and from assignment to “other than temporary duty
on other vessels of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels of a similar classification
not expected to be assigned combat missions”). See also Peach, Women in Combat, supra note 17, at
159.
74. GAO REPORT, supra note 70, at 3.

AND
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75

maneuver, or shock effect” .
Even as opportunities for full integration for women within the military
continue to improve, the combat exclusion stands as a policy which still sets
some formal limits. While these limiting policies mark the official gap between
the integration stories of gender and race, throughout the remainder of the
Article, we will see other ways that gender—especially for women of color—
continues to mark disparate outcomes in success.
B. Gays and Lesbians: The Effect of Exclusion on Integration Success Stories
To understand why it would be inappropriate to indiscriminately credit the
military for its integration success, one need look no further than the ways in
which the organization still blatantly tolerates some forms of identity-based
discrimination. For as successful as Truman’s declaration for racial equality has
come to be perceived, another president failed miserably in his attempt to
76
liberate gay and lesbian soldiers and sailors from their closeted lives. On
January 29, 1993, President Bill Clinton drafted a memo to the Secretary of
Defense directing him to draft an Executive Order that would end
discrimination in the military, “in a manner that is practical, realistic, and
consistent with the high standards of combat effectiveness and unit cohesion our
77
Armed Forces must maintain.”
President Clinton’s plan was, however, met with insurmountable
opposition from civilians, the military, and Congress. He was forced to abandon
his initial directive and settle for the compromise referred to as the “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue” policy. The policy allows gays and lesbians to serve in
the military so long as they do not identify themselves as gay or lesbian and
abstain from intimate homosexual relationships. This compromise did not
achieve the goal of protecting gay men and lesbians within the military. In fact,
the Department of Defense still maintains a version of DoD Directive 1332.14,
which once stated:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the
military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by
their statements demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct
seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of
such members adversely impacts the ability of the Military Services to maintain
78
discipline, good order, and morale . . . .

While the language of the above-quoted Directive has been revised,

79

75. Id. at 7 (alteration added).
76. As others have indicated, the Armed Forces fear only “overt homosexuality”; gays and
lesbians can serve as long as they do not come out. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender in the Military:
Androcentrism and Institutional Reform, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 227, n.43 (1993).
77. Memorandum from President William Clinton on Ending Discrimination on the Basis of
Sexual Orientation in the Armed Forces to the Secretary of Defense (Jan. 29, 1993), available at
http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/pres1-29-93.pdf.
78. Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations, pt. 1, § H
(1982), available at http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/regulation41.pdf (alteration added).
79. See Dep’t of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations, encl. 3, at
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similar language in federal statutes still provides the policy guidance supporting
Department of Defense Regulations that exclude gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
80
from service. One way that the exclusion of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from
the military detracts from the military’s integration success narrative is obvious:
a group of individuals is being excluded based purely on its status identity.
Separate from the choice to exclude on this basis, nothing about the policy is
related to notions that these service members are incapable of performing.
Certainly, recent data has been compiled to advance the claim that “Don’t Ask,
81
82
Don’t Tell” is costly and patently unfair discrimination. Formally, the
exclusion is maintained under the premises of ensuring combat effectiveness
83
and unit cohesion, and shifting public opinion supporting allowing gays to
serve openly has had little effect on the policy. For example, a 1993 RAND study
concluded that even though military members still have negative attitudes
about the service of gays and lesbians, sexual orientation discrimination—like
race discrimination—could be effectively eliminated by instituting a policy
creating a conduct-based standard, which would acknowledge that sexual
84
orientation is not germane to military service. More recently, a 2004 Urban
Institute study concluded that at least 60,000 gay persons were serving in the
85
Armed Forces, and a 2004 Gallup poll found that sixty-three percent of
86
respondents favored allowing gay men and lesbians to serve openly. While the

¶ E3.A1.1.8.1.1 (1994) [hereinafter DoDD 1332.14], available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/
corres/pdf/133214p.pdf.
80. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2000) (“The presence in the armed forces of persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk
to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of
military capability.”).
81. See, e.g., FRANK J. BARRETT, ET AL., THE PALM CENTER, FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF “DON’T ASK,
DON’T TELL”: HOW MUCH DOES THE GAY BAN COST? 2 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.palm
center.org/files/active/0/2006-FebBlueRibbonFinalRpt.pdf (challenging the results of a General
Accountability Office study of the same subject and determining that between 1994 and 2003 the cost
of implementing the policy was $363.8 million).
82. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNIFORM DISCRIMINATION: THE “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” POLICY
OF THE U.S. MILITARY 3 (2003) (“In theory, all servicemembers are treated with dignity and respect
regardless of sexual orientation. In practice, gay servicemembers endure anti-gay remarks, namecalling, threats, and even physical attacks.”), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2003/usa0103/
USA0103.pdf.
83. See RAND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 161; Gregory Herek & Aaron Belkin,
Sexual Orientation and Military Service: Prospects for Organizational and Individual Change in the United
States, in MILITARY LIFE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SERVING IN PEACE AND COMBAT, VOL. 4, AT 119 (Thomas
Brit et al. eds., 2005) (“[D]iscussion in the United States has focused primarily on whether allowing
openly gay and lesbian personnel to serve would undermine the military’s ability to accomplish its
mission. . . .”) (alteration added); Elizabeth Kier, Discrimination and Military Cohesion: An Organization
Perspective, in BEYOND ZERO, supra note 21, at 38 (discussing sexual orientation integration as a
danger to morale, good order, and discipline).
84. See RAND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY, supra note 3, at xxiv–xxv.
85. Lizette Alvarez, Gay Groups Renew Drive Against “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2006, at 18.
86. Id. (citing also to Pew Research Center survey from the same year claiming that sixty
percent of respondents favor allowing gays to openly serve); Gallup Poll, Gays in Military: Public Says
Go Ahead and Tell, Dec. 21, 2004. The civilian numbers, however, are very different from military
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official military policy remains that of excluding from serving all but “hidden”
gay men and lesbians, recent data suggests that in these times of increased
military demands due to the “War on Terrorism,” the Services have been
87
discharging fewer persons based on homosexuality. Given that societal
acceptance of gays and lesbians being allowed to serve openly is growing, and
the RAND study conclusion that integration opposition could be overcome by
regulating conduct, the military’s opposition to open service seems hollow. It
certainly appears to be out of step with the positive integration narrative with
regard to race.
Apart from taking away from the integration success narrative because it
involves exclusion based upon sexuality alone, the exclusion of gays and
lesbians from the military also negatively affects the narrative by excluding an
important part of the very groups it wishes to include: racial minorities, but
specifically those who are gay, lesbian, or bisexual. This often unacknowledged
overlap of race and sexual orientation identity markers has created a problem
for those wishing to construct a comprehensive conversation about integration.
For those who do not see this as a conversation about overlapping bases for
subordination, emphasis is placed on the dissimilar nature of race and sexual
orientation, which then explains their different integration trajectories. These
critics, essentially, have concerns with sexual orientation integration of the
military being viewed as directly analogous in some ways to race and gender
88
integration. The point here is not to extensively rehash the propriety of such
89
analogies, but to make the separate point that there are dangers in embracing

respondents. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HOMOSEXUALS AND U.S. MILITARY POLICY:
CURRENT ISSUES, at CRS-6–CRS-7 (May, 27, 2005) (discussing a MILITARY TIMES poll of active-duty
military respondents, which found that only twenty-five percent favored allowing gays to serve
openly) [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
87. Evelyn Nieves & Ann Scott Tyson, Fewer Gays Being Discharged Since 9/11: “Don’t Ask”
Ousters At Lowest Level Yet, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2005, at A1 (noting that discharges based on
homosexuality have declined from 1227 in 2001 to 653 in 2004); CRS REPORT, supra note 86, at CRS-11
(displaying twenty-four years of homosexual discharge statistics, which illustrate a steady decline in
discharges each year between 2001 and 2004). Some claim the avoidance of enforcing the policy
recurs during times of increased manpower needs. Katzenstein & Reppy, supra note 21, at 18.
88. RAND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 158–60 (discussing the applicability of
the racial and gender integration stories, and finding race was the more applicable experience to the
case of homosexuality). Cf. John S. Butler, Homosexuals and the Military Establishment, 31 SOC’Y 13, 17
(Nov.–Dec. 1993) (arguing that the integration of homosexuals into the military should not be
grounded in a racial or black civil rights metaphor); but see Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay
Rights, Civil Rights: The Deployment of Race/Sexual Orientation Analogies in the Debates About the “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 285–89
(Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999) [hereinafter BLACK MEN ON RACE] (criticizing Butler’s aversion to a
race/sexuality analogy in the military as distinguishing color/race which conveys identity from
sexuality which is behavioral).
89. These types of race/sexuality comparative arguments have been extensively critiqued. See
Carbado, supra note 88, at 289–96; Margaret Russell, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Identity and the Civil Rights
Agenda, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 33 (1994); Jane Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States:
Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1994). On the dangers of
comparing various forms of identity-based discrimination, see generally Stephanie Wildman & Trina
Grillo, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implications of Making Comparisons Between Racism and
Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397.
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as legitimate an integration narrative for an organization that privileges some
marginalized communities while disadvantaging others. Doing so creates a
world where the included, but marginal, are encouraged to participate in the
ostracism of the fully excluded. For example, many officers of color chastised
President Clinton’s plan to integrate gays as an attempt to treat sexuality like
race—categories they perceived to be irreconcilably distinct. This view was
represented in the comments of the then African-American Chairman of his
Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was heavily opposed to lifting the ban. In a letter to
Congress, General Colin Powell stated:
Skin color is a benign, non-behavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is
perhaps the most profound of human behavioral characteristics. Comparison of
the two is a convenient but invalid argument. I believe the privacy rights of all
Americans in uniform have to be considered especially since those rights are
90
often infringed upon by conditions of military service.

The military’s top black officer rejecting the race-sexual orientation metaphor
clearly hurt the credibility of the plan to remove the ban. Following Powell’s
letter, two other high ranking black officers criticized the race-sexual orientation
analogy, saying the traits were like “apples and oranges” and calling into
question the incomparably unique history of prejudice and bigotry surrounding
91
Blacks in the U.S.
Others resist the impulse to engage the analogy question and instead focus
on the dangers attendant in so stringently maintaining hard lines between race,
gender, and sexuality classifications. In the foreword to Black Men on Race Gender
and Sexuality, Kimberlé Crenshaw spoke of the necessity to integrate gender and
92
sexuality into black political consciousness and discourses. So too it is
important to situate race into discourses of gender and sexuality. There is a need
to debunk the notion that the military is comprised of separate and distinct
populations of persons who either are racial minorities, white women, or gay
men and lesbians. As Devon Carbado has articulated, “[this] oppositional
formulation of identity (African Americans and women, African Americans and
the disabled, African Americans and gays and lesbians) linguistically and
conceptually authenticates an essential notion of Blackness that, at the very least,
93
is gendered and heterosexist.” The goal here is to draw attention to two issues
that such identity separation encourages us to overlook: (1) that multiple forms
94
of subordination operate in concert across categories of difference; and (2) that
90. See Charles Moskos, From Citizens’ Army to Social Laboratory, WILSON Q. 26 (Winter 1993).
91. Lynne Duke, Drawing Parallels—Gays and Blacks; Linking Military Ban to Integration Fight Stirs
Outrage, Sympathy, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at A1. (quoting Lt. Gen. Calvin Waller and Lt. Gen.
Samuel Ebbeson expressing outrage over the comparison); Butler, supra note 88 (discussing Gen.
Powell’s statements and rejecting the race/sexual orientation analogy). On this claim about the
uniqueness of the black experience vis-à-vis other groups’ experiences with subordination, see Roy
L. Brooks, Race As an Under-Inclusive and Over-Inclusive Concept, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 9, 19–21
(1994).
92. Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Foreword, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, supra note 88, at xii.
93. Carbado, supra note 88, at 288 (making the claim and criticizing its genesis in the work of
Brooks, supra note 91).
94. See Darren L. Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and
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excluding gay men and lesbians helps to maintain the pretense that people are
typically marked by a single social identity category, thereby erasing any need
to acknowledge or be concerned for those affected by more than one basis to
discriminate. With regard to the latter claim, it seems odd that at this advanced
stage in our understanding of the operation of status identity that it would still
be necessary to draw special attention to the challenges of persons viewed as
multiply deviant. As the data below seem to illustrate, however, in some
contexts, the military still respects a dichotomy of difference that separates the
experiences of women from those of racial minorities, without acknowledging
the unique circumstances of persons existing at the intersection of the two (or
more) categories.
If gay men and lesbians were allowed to serve openly, it would become
clear that sexuality—like gender—touches persons across race. When sexuality
is left off the table we not only pay less attention to the various aspects of
identity that coalesce to define particular persons, but we also face the danger of
treating sexuality as if it is a category that does not affect minorities at all—as if
95
there were no persons of color serving who were also gay or lesbian.
Beyond the ways in which excluding sexual minorities masks the presence
of intersectional identities, the policy also obscures the notion that each person
who is subordinated in some way has a “shared status”—an understanding that,
across race, class, and nation, “a life is a life is a life” and each should be
96
valued. Including members of some marginalized populations while excluding
others undermines the concept that our well being is interconnected and we all
benefit from staking out principled positions against subordinating rules and
97
policies. When we ignore shared status, the courts become emboldened to
reflect back to us our acceptance of separatism. With regard to integration
narratives, the avoidance of this interconnectedness principle facilitates opinions
that embrace the military as equally justified when it integrates as when it
excludes. A belief in shared status should undermine the ability of one to
maintain a coherent narrative of integration success, unless all oppressed
individuals are treated fairly.
A recent example of the failure of the concept of shared status to be

Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 624–34 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics:
A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and Politics of “Sexual Orientation,” 48
HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1299 (1997) (“Intersectional analyses and projects are valuable to sexual
minorities, racial and ethnic minorities, and other subordinated groups because they can enhance
our joint capacity to understand the interconnectedness of multifaceted power systems that stand on
intersected axes of privileges.”).
95. See Carbado, supra note 88, at 286–89 (discussing how certain race and sexuality discourses
render black gays and lesbians invisible).
96. THE PARADOX OF LOYALTY: AN AFRICAN AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM
193–94 (J. Malveaux & Regina Green eds., 2002).
97. The late Prof. Jerome Culp of Duke Law School described this being concerned with the
oppression of others as a first step in the process of defeating self-hatred. See Jerome McCristal Culp,
Jr., The Seventh Aspect of Self-Hatred: Race, LatCrit, and Fighting the Status Quo, 55 FLA. L. REV. 425, 436
(2003) (“How does one combat . . . self hatred? One way is to accept the multiple identities of others
and to hear the power of their stories in our own lives. Hearing the oppression of others is also a first
step to slaying self-hatred.”).
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narrative-influencing can be seen in the Supreme Court’s decision in Rumsfeld v.
98
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR). This case held that it was
constitutional for the federal government to condition university funding on
compliance with the Solomon Amendment—legislation that requires schools to
99
treat military recruiters on the same footing with other employers. The Court
allowed the government to cut funding to any college or university that bans
military recruiters due to the school’s position that the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
policy constitutes unacceptable discrimination. Since the FAIR litigants were
primarily law schools and professors, the recruiters at issue were primarily
100
those recruiting potential Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps candidates.
In effect, the Court that used the military’s integration success to justify allowing
101
schools to continue admissions policies based upon race in Grutter, was also
willing to support a policy that limited—based on sexual orientation—those
who could be considered for the JAG Corps. Even though the Court’s decision
102
was not based upon the Equal Protection doctrine, there is a message about
equality in the FAIR holding. That message is that the difference in treatment—
the incoherence between race and sexuality narratives in the military—is
acceptable. Hence, the military is allowed to fashion different stories around
what it constructs as oppositional, rather than intersectional identities (race,
gender, and sexuality). In the very least, subscribing to this brand of identitypolitics should prevent an organization from holding itself out as a model for
integration.
C. The Death of Race- and Gender-Consciousness and Integration Success
This Part provides a separate basis to challenge the accuracy of the
military’s integration success story: the fact that, with regard to promotion and
retention (as opposed to recruiting), the Armed Forces have moved away from
explicit considerations of how race and gender have historically been used to
discriminate against minorities. Essentially, this Part details how the military
became a victim of the power of its integration narrative, as the so-called success
led to lawsuits alleging reverse discrimination. Building on the backlash against

98. 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
99. Id. at 1313.
100. CRS REPORT, supra note 86, at CRS-31.
101. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
102. While the plaintiffs premised their case on a claim that the Solomon Amendment led to
violations of their free speech rights, this was so styled due to the varying degrees of scrutiny
afforded to identity classifications under Equal Protection analysis. Some classifications, such as race
and gender, receive heightened forms of scrutiny as opposed to rational basis categories, such as
sexual orientation. The strict scrutiny that the Court affords to national origin and racial
classifications is articulated in cases such as Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) and Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Croson, discussed supra note 53, provides the analysis for government
race-based affirmative action programs. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), articulates the
intermediate scrutiny standard for gender. Rational basis analysis applies to most other
classifications, including sexual orientation—although Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), represents
the rare case where a government drawing a classification premised on sexual orientation was found
to fail the test for lack of a legitimate purpose.
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affirmative action which took place in federal courts in the late 1980s and early
1990s, a series of military reverse-discrimination cases led to significant changes
to the equal opportunity language used by each of the Services in their
promotion and retention guidance. These changes have resulted in race- and
gender-neutral promotion policies. While presented here, the effects of these
changes will be explored in Part III.
Until the end of the Clinton administration, the separate Services used
meaningful race- and gender-conscious equal opportunity statements in the
103
precepts to promotion boards. The guidance was not precisely the same from
year to year, but each statement mentioned the significance of race and gender
identity—at times, including reference to the subtle ways in which identity can
create disadvantage—and the effect of past histories of discrimination. For
example, precepts in the Army typically included language to the effect that
each board should consider “the past personal and institutional discrimination”
104
faced by women and minorities in the service. While the boards challenged in
the reverse-discrimination cases did not use quotas to ensure race and gender
representation in promotion results, the precepts did also instruct that “[t]he
goal for this board is to achieve a percentage of minority and female selections
not less than the selection rate for all officers in the promotion zone (first time
105
considered category).”
In their precepts, the Navy and Marine Corps included language to the
effect that equal opportunity should be available for all personnel “without
regard to race, creed, color, gender, or national origin,” but also indicated that
the boards should “be alert to the possibility that past discrimination may have
106
placed these officers at a disadvantage in the Performance Evaluation System.”
The instructions went on to state minority officers, especially African
107
Americans, had not historically been promoted at the same rates as Whites.
Finally, the Air Force, by comparison, used language that was a bit more tepid,
stating, “[y]our evaluation of minority and some officers must clearly afford
them fair and equitable consideration,” and “[i]n your evaluation of the records
of minority and women officers, you should be particularly sensitive to the
possibility that past individuals . . . may have placed these officers at a
108
disadvantage from a total career perspective.” While the precise language
varied, previously, each of the Services utilized precepts that directed boards to

103. Precepts are instructions provided from the relevant Service Secretary to the Board, which
direct the Board to be convened, provide a percentage of candidates to be selected, and set the rules
and policies for the operation of the Board surrounding the selection. For a discussion of the raceand gender-conscious precept language, see notes 104–107.
104. RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH DIVISION, MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES IN
OFFICER CAREER PROGRESSION 117 (Susan D. Hosek et al. eds, 2001) [hereinafter RAND MINORITY
AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY], available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/
MR1184/. See also Neely Tucker, Judge Halts an Army Policy on Promotion: Ruling Says Gender, Race
Overly Stressed, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2002, at A1 (discussing the Army policy and the Saunders case).
105. RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 117.
106. Id. at 118.
107. Id. at 119.
108. Id. at 120 (alterations added).
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consider the special history of challenges facing women and minorities.
These more explicit and remedial race-conscious policies were significantly
disrupted by a group of antidiscrimination cases, which culminated in the
109
holding in Saunders v. White. In this case, the plaintiff, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt.
Col.) Raymond Sanders, was a retired JAG officer who was white and male. He
sued the Army claiming that due to the Army’s equal opportunity policy, he
was discriminated against by the 1996 and 1997 Army JAG Colonel Promotion
110
Selection Boards. Initially, he claimed that the Army’s precept referencing past
discrimination and its directive that boards attempt to promote minorities and
111
women at rates consistent with their overall selection rate,
were
112
discriminatory—“unconstitutional both facially and as applied.” Later, he
amended his complaint to allege that he was “denied ‘equal protection of the
laws [through the use of] racial and sexual classifications in [the] composition of
113
the [promotion] selection board.’” In discussing Saunders’ standing to raise his
claim, the court determined his injury was his “inability to compete on equal
footing” with minority and female candidates and that the critical question was
whether he was being “personally subject[ed] to different treatment” as a result
114
of the Army’s equal opportunity policy.
In the Saunders case, the Army provided no compelling interest for the
consideration of race in the initial evaluation of records, instead choosing to
115
argue that evaluation in Saunders’ case involved no racial classification. For

109. 191 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D.D.C. 2002). While Saunders was the case most relevant to promotion, it
was predated slightly by the case of Christian v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 793 (2000) (rejecting the
Army’s use of an identical equal opportunity policy statement regarding minorities and women
being considered by its mandatory retirement boards).
110. Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 98. For the 1996 and 1997 boards, the Army used the following
specific equal opportunity language:
In evaluating the files of the officers you are about to consider, be alert to the possibility of
past personal or institutional discrimination—either intentional or inadvertent—in the
assignment patterns, evaluations, or professional development of officers in those groups
for which you have an equal opportunity selection goal. . . . This goal will not be
interpreted as guidance to meet a particular quota. . . . Prior to recess, review and report in
the board report the extent to which minority and female officers were selected at a rate
less than . . . non-minority officers.
Id. at 121. In a separate appendix, the precept instructed that the goal was “to achieve a selection rate
in each minority and gender group . . . that is not less than the selection rate for all officers in the
promotion zone . . . .” Id. at 123. For a discussion of the Army-promulgated equal opportunity
instructions prior to Saunders, see Bigelow, supra note 36, at 161–64; Capt. Holly O’Grady Cook,
Affirmative Action: Should the Army Mend It or End It?, 151 MIL. L. REV. 113, 140–45 (1996) (noting that
the board instructions, including equal opportunity guidance, were contained in DA Memo 600-2).
111. Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 113 n.22.
112. Id. at 98.
113. Id. (alterations added). His claim stated that discrimination existed both in the initial review
stages of the Board and during the review and revote stages. Id. at 111. Lt. Col. Saunders also
challenged the composition of the boards that failed to select him, but these challenges were denied.
114. Id. at 111 (alteration added).
115. Id. at 128. The Army’s position was in the 1996 and 1997 JAG Colonel promotion boards, the
boards only revoted on one selectee—a white woman—and hence race did not factor into those
boards’ decisions. Id. In their motion to dismiss, the Army claimed among other things that in 1996
the equal opportunity policy did not discriminate and that in 1997, Saunders would not have been
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gender, the Army indicated the policy was necessary to “create the perception of
equal treatment and . . . to redress the consistent under-selection of women in
116
the promotion process.” The court was willing to apply the Army’s proffered
rationale for using gender to the use of race and determined that neither the
Army’s desire to create the perception of equal treatment, nor its commitment to
remedying underselection would support the consideration of either race or
117
gender in selection boards. In response to the argument that the Army’s
present and past history of discrimination could be used to support the policies,
118
119
the court, relying heavily on Croson and Wygant, stated:
Thus, in the instant case, the Court’s inquiry will not focus on whether the Army
has a compelling interest in remedying past or present discrimination . . . .
Instead, the Court will examine the statistical and testimonial evidence
submitted by the Army to determine whether there is a strong basis in the
evidence to support the Army’s conclusion that remedial action was
120
necessary . . . .”
121

Although the Army presented the court with a publication which detailed
twenty years of data for black personnel, the court was not convinced by the
data. In its ruling, the court found that: (1) the report did not indicate whether
“there was discrimination against black officers from 1983 to 1993”; (2) “the data
and conclusions therein relate to the Army in general, rather than specifically to
the JAG Corps”; and (3) the conclusions within the report did not “represent
strong or convincing evidence of past or present discrimination against black
122
officers.” Specifically, the court took notice of the report’s conclusion that, at
times, Blacks promoted as fast or faster to lower ranks and that the difference in
promotion rates to senior ranks had been greatly decreased in the previous
123
decade. The court thus held the findings were not consistent with the
requirement that the government’s discriminatory conduct be “pervasive,
124
systematic and obstinate.”
The Saunders court did not find that the previous history of discrimination

selected even in the absence of the equal opportunity policy. Id. at 99.
116. Id. at 128 n.39.
117. Id. at 129.
118. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is
to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”) (alteration added).
119. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1989) (“[E]videntiary support for the
conclusion that remedial action is warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is
challenged . . . .”) (alteration added).
120. Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
121. JAMES A. THOMAS, RACE RELATIONS RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE 1970’S: A
COLLECTION OF READINGS (1988).
122. Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 130–31.
123. Id. at 131. Notably, this data is inconsistent with later promotion data, which found that men
of color, women, and women of color in particular, have promotion rates poorer than those of white
men. See RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 44–45.
124. Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 131–32 (citing Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995)).
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in the Armed Forces was the compelling interest that supported the Army’s
program. Instead, the court determined that due to the Army’s failure to present
sufficient evidence that remedial actions in the form of racial classifications were
125
warranted, they had failed to provide the “first step of strict scrutiny.”
Moreover, despite the Army’s claims that Saunders would have been
unsuccessful even with no equal opportunity policy, the court placed the
greatest amount of emphasis upon the question of whether the plaintiff was
126
subject to a discriminatory process. It then surmised that the Army had failed
to “demonstrate that both the 1996 and 1997 selection boards would have
reached the same conclusion regarding the promotion of plaintiff” in the
127
absence of the equal opportunity directions. In the end, the court held that the
Army’s policy, both at the initial stage and the review and revote stage,
“unjustifiably provide[d] a benefit to minority and female officers,” which
128
facially violated the Fifth Amendment.
129
While the Saunders decision was not the sole impetus, after the reversediscrimination cases, a significant sea change was signaled for the use of equal
opportunity statements in military promotions. Unlike the various race- and
130
gender-conscious statements referenced above,
the next generation of
statements used language that only referenced equality in the most general
terms, if at all. For example, the Army simply abandoned any equal opportunity
131
statement. The Navy was not so restrictive, but it backed away from its
previous language as well. The equal opportunity guidance in the precept for
the Fiscal Year 2007 (FY-07) Active Duty Navy JAG Commander Selection
132
Board, which will be discussed more fully in Part III.B, indicated: “The

125. Id. at 133–34.
126. Id. at 111 (essentially, the Court’s central inquiry was whether the 1996 and 1997 boards
contained race and gender classifications that were motivating factors in the decision not to promote
Saunders). In a footnote, the Court addressed at length the problems it believed ensued from
accepting as a defense the claim that the plaintiff would not have received the desired benefit even
where there was no consideration of race or gender. Id. at 112 n.21.
127. Id. at 112. The Court did acknowledge that the Army could not prove the contention
because, in accordance with procedures, the records of the boards had been destroyed. Id. at 112–13.
128. Id. at 137 n.55 (alteration added).
129. After Adarand, President William Clinton ordered an affirmative action review that applied
to the military. See supra note 47. Before Saunders, some military personnel saw that the Army
policies would not stand up to the analysis in Croson and Adarand. See Bigelow, supra note 36, at 165–
67; Cook, supra note 110, at 117.
130. See supra notes 103–108 and accompanying text.
131. For instance, the Army issues on a yearly basis a Department of Army Memorandum (DA
Memo 600-2) promulgating policies and procedures for promotion boards. In 1996, the DA Memo
600-2 issued to the board that considered Saunders contained robust considerations of race and
gender in the selection process; these guidelines included a goal that the minority selection numbers
approximate the overall selection rate. See Cook, supra note 110, at 143. In 2006, DA Memo 600-2
provided no equal opportunity guidance, goals, or policies—only a requirement that boards report
the statistics for “racial, ethnic, and gender categories . . . .” See DA Memo 600-2, Policies and
Procedures for Active-Duty List Officer Selection Boards 52 (Sept. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/m600_2.pdfat 52.
132. For this board, the precept was contained in a Memorandum from the Secretary of the
Navy. Memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy to the President, FY-07 Active Duty
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Department of the Navy is dedicated to equality of treatment and opportunity
133
for all personnel without regard to race, creed, gender or national origin.”
While the statement goes on to say that these categories should neither “limit
opportunities” nor create disadvantage, the ending paragraph instructs that the
guidance should not be interpreted as permitting preferential treatment based
134
on these classifications. In addition to making no statements about the effects
of past discrimination or how one might have been disadvantaged as a result of
one’s minority status, the wording seems to suggest strongly that the goal is to
ensure these identity categories do not factor into the board’s decisionmaking.
III. ASSESSING THE DANGERS OF PERCEIVED INTEGRATION SUCCESS
Certainly, it is true that the military has been more successful at achieving
racial integration than many institutions, but this does not mean that military
work environments have been unproblematic for individuals traditionally
viewed as outsiders. Within this Part of the Article, two dangers of an overstated
integration success story which pertain to the military as a work environment
are analyzed. First, Part III.A explores the difficulties facing minorities and
women who must manage the effects of identity within the military in a postSaunders world. As Professor Kenji Yoshino has argued about civil rights in
general, within the military, outsiders need not be white, male, heterosexual,
and middle class to succeed within the institution; they need only act as if they
135
are. In looking at this need to assimilate, the effect of the uniqueness of the
military environment on identity performance is considered, as well as how the
predominant narrative of integration success may upset the desired aims of
performing toward dominant norms. Principally, this first danger is understood
to be that individuals marked by difference in military environments will find it
difficult to be fully included in the manner necessary to ensure professional
success. It is argued that this is the case because identity performance or other
assimilative practices are undermined by the success story. In effect, the success
story provides support for the military’s choice to elect race- and gender-neutral
promotion and retention policies, which may tend to nullify any benefits of
assimilative practices.
The second danger of the success story relates to institutional rather than
personal behaviors. Where an organization views itself as generally succeeding
with regard to integration, the danger arises that a type of complacency with

Commander Judge Advocate General’s Corps Promotion Selection Board and FY-07 Active Duty
Lieutenant Commander Judge Advocate General’s Officer Continuation on Active Duty Selection
Board (Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter FY-07 Active Duty Navy Commander JAG Precept], available at
http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/328036F7-A29D-4039-B025-C431CA23B3B4/0/FY07USN
O5JAGPrecept.pdf. The FY-07 Board was the most recent Board at the time of this writing, the
results of which are discussed in Part III.B, infra.
133. Id. at app. C.
134. Id. at app. C ¶ 4.
135. Yoshino, supra note 19, at 775. See also MOSKOS & BUTLER, supra note 7, at 93 (noting the
work of Christopher Jencks, who has described the following paradox within race relations: “[T]hat
while many [W]hites will treat [B]lacks as equals if they ‘act white,’ few are prepared to treat
[B]lacks as equals if they ‘act black.’” (alterations added)).
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that success may develop. This complacency will arise even as the organization
continues to emphasize its commitment to diversity and equal opportunity for
136
all within the institution. As a way of exploring whether there is a disjuncture
between the narrative of integration success and the experience of women and
people of color in the military, Part III.B analyzes a series of years of Navy
officer promotion statistics. The data reveal that minority selection numbers
widely vary from year to year for some career fields, and that those inhabiting
multiple identity categories face potentially unnoticed and enhanced
impediments to success. Due to small sample sizes and the limited number of
years discussed, the statistics are largely used descriptively rather than to make
empirical claims. Even so, they do suggest that the military should be vigilant
with regard to monitoring the promotion prospects of minorities.
A. Integration Success and Identity Performances within the Military
The exploration of workplaces as environments that reward and punish
based on how workers present their race, gender, sexual orientation, and other
ascriptive markers of difference has been brought to the fore in the work of
137
138
scholars analyzing workplace culture, identity performance, and demands
139
for assimilative conduct. These theories, however, have not been significantly
explored within the context of the military. Within the various military services,
there are numerous and varied workplaces or commands. The structures of
these commands are often unique, and typically defined by the unit’s
organization type and mission. For example, it is a given that within operational
commands, at times, units deploy. Deployments require individuals to live in
close quarters, often away from their primary worksites and, sometimes abroad.
Additionally, the Services are environments with specific and heightened social
140
norms. Not only are these norms raced and gendered, but they may be
exacerbated by the greater amounts of time members must spend both with

136. For example, the Chief of Naval Operations recently promulgated a Diversity Policy where
diversity is described as “a strategic imperative.” See Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs, CNO
Calls Diversity a Strategic Imperative, NAVY NEWSSTAND (online), June 6, 2006, available at
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=24463.
137. Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 655–56 (2005).
138. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 15, at 1262–63; Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth
Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 701 (2001); The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory: Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1757 (2003); Race to
the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645,
1645 (2000). See also Harris, supra note 12, at 121–22.
139. Yoshino, supra note 19, at 771–83 (discussing the demands of assimilation in general, and
specifically, the three methods for achieving it: conversion, passing, and covering); see also Barbara J.
Flagg, Fashioning A Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J.
2009, 2036 (1995) (discussing Title VII as a tool to combat assimilationist workplace policies);
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365, 410–19 (2006) (proposing an approach to determine when employers should
be prevented from maintaining rules requiring assimilation in appearance and speech).
140. See Katzenstein & Reppy, supra note 21, at 7 (claiming, with regard to the entrenched
gendered nature of the forces, “the masculinist norms of military culture have come to be identified
with an exclusionary male and heterosexist politics, an identity that is tenacious but not changing”).
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fellow military members and away from family members and personal social
141
networks. Finally, some challenges arise from the fact that the military is
conceived not only as an organization that defines what one does, but also who
one is. Based on these factors, negotiating identity in this environment may be
142
especially challenging—involving, at times, legal and social consequences and
a requirement that norms must be maintained across one’s professional and
personal life. Applying the identity performance and assimilative conduct
research and theories, Part III.A.1 discusses the burdens attendant in service
members having to manage their identities within the military, and it
specifically analyzes the continuum or arc of performance ostensibly required
for minorities and women to succeed. When attempting to chart a path to
success, one must also consider the myriad strategies persons ascribed multiple
markers of difference or deviance must deploy to “work” identity within the
military. Part III.A.2 suggests that, given institutional behavioral norms and the
organizational recommitment to colorblindness, it is questionable whether the
military is an environment where much advantage can be gained through the
working of one’s identity.
1. Myriad Strategies for Managing Multiple Identities in a Colorblind World
In order to effectively illustrate the demands of performance on women
and people of color within the Armed Forces, an example will be provided in
this section. As this Article is concerned with the particular difficulties facing
persons who inhabit multiple identity categories and to be consistent with the
data discussed in Part III.B, the illustration will involve a military officer who is
African-American and female. Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati would describe
the identity work necessary for success as contingent upon her negotiating her
sense of self versus her understanding of the identity the military would prefer
143
or value. As an outsider, this would include choices about how to manage
144
stereotypes associated with her race and gender. Similarly, the scholarship of
Kenji Yoshino suggests that she would need to make decisions about covering
(downplaying) or reverse covering (emphasizing) her race and gender
differences to succeed within what is certainly a predominantly white, male
145
environment. An example of her negotiating identity or covering could take

141. While many jobs involve working long hours, military forces are unique in that they deploy
as units to support various missions. With regard to the Navy, in particular, forces are routinely
deployed for several month periods on ships and submarines, forcing members to exist in close
quarters.
142. Unlike most other workplaces, failing to observe proper courtesies in the military could
result in administrative or criminal processing for any number of offenses. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 889–891
(2000) (codifying the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Articles 89, 90, and 91, respectively,
pertaining to disrespect, disobedience, and insubordinate conduct offenses).
143. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 15, at 1263–64.
144. This includes the concept of avoiding the implications of negative stereotypes and
exploiting positive ones. Id. at 1269–70.
145. This is not to suggest that there is an “essential” white, male experience, but rather a
commentary that some social activities may become preferred among a sizeable number of any
numerically dominant group, which then tend to set the requirements for suitable social behaviors
for an organization on the whole. My own comment would be that participation in athletics—most
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the shape of avoiding displays of what might be considered ethnic speech or
147
appearance. Reverse covering or exploiting identity could take place in those
instances where she agreed to engage in recruiting activities or other duties
where she would serve as a confirming symbol of the integration success
narrative. Aside from merely deciding how to present or mitigate her race and
gender, she might also have to make decisions about engaging in types of social
activities prevalent among colleagues, even if it would not typically be her
148
preference to do so.
In keeping with this Article’s previous analysis of how some critics create a
false dichotomy between race and sexual orientation, other identity concerns can
be explored were our black, female officer also to be gay. Beyond the race and
gender work, there would also be some negotiation required around her
minority sexual orientation. While there are some ways one might try to cover
149
sexual orientation within the military, the predominant form of assimilative
sports being acceptable, but some clearly preferred—was such an activity. This is not surprising,
given that each Service has appearance and physical-fitness requirements. While maintaining fitness
is a personal and command obligation, the additional social value of the activity was conveyed
through these norms.
146. RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 61 (presenting the
statement of a black officer: “You need to avoid ‘black’ mannerisms—speech, walk—because the
first impression is very important.”).
147. This could extend to how she dresses or grooms in and out of uniform. For example, the
military uniform requirements allow women to wear ethnic hairstyles as long as they otherwise
conform to length and grooming requirements. The specific language provides:
Multiple braids are authorized. Braided hairstyles shall be conservative and conform to
the guidelines listed herein. . . . Corn row ends shall not protrude from the head, and shall
be secured only with inconspicuous rubber bands that match the color of the hair.
Appropriateness of a hairstyle shall also be judged by its appearance when headgear is
worn. All headgear shall fit snugly and comfortably around the largest part of the head
without distortion or excessive gaps.
U.S. Navy Uniform Regulations (NAVPERS 15665I) § 2201.1b, available at http://buperscd.
technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/508/unireg/uregMenu.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). While the
regulations permit the wearing of ethnic hairstyles, making the choice to do so, however, certainly
would be a move away from assimilative conduct. See Carbado & Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman,
supra note 138, at 714–19 (offering the fictional story of “Mary,” a black woman with “dreadlocks”
who was denied partnership in a corporate law firm where four other black women—with relaxed
hairstyles—were selected, as an example of how, based upon identity performance or assimilative
conduct, employers may treat differently persons sharing the same status markers of identity); Flagg
supra note 139, at 211–12 (discussing potential consequences that can arise at work when a black
female employee conveys a cultural perspective through speech and grooming choices, but how
similar consequences can also occur for a black woman attempting to fit in with transparent but
majority-influenced workplace norms).
On using hairstyle as a display of racial identity, see Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Tracy L. Dumas,
The Hair Dilemma: Conform to Mainstream Expectations or Emphasize Racial Identity, 14 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL’Y 407, 408 (2007); Laura Morgan Roberts & Darryl D. Roberts, Testing the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law: The Business, Legal and Ethical Ramifications of Cultural Profiling at Work, 14
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 369, 378–79 (2007) (discussing the ways wearing an “Afro” may be
perceived as a political choice at work).
148. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 15, at 1264 (analyzing one type of identity compromise as a
person choosing to socialize with one’s colleagues for the purposes of improving his or her chances
for promotion).
149. According to Kenji Yoshino, since the military claims to prohibit conduct rather than status,
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conduct would be an attempt to “pass” as straight. Doing so within the
military environment is necessary to avoid being administratively discharged or
151
criminally prosecuted. This behavior may not be as simple as not mentioning
one’s same-sex partner or dating preferences, because “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
152
mandates silence for gays serving in the Armed Forces. The goal of passing
would require the service member to put to rest any notion of a presumed
difference, which might also make it necessary to display the outward signs of a
153
heterosexual lifestyle. Of note, in the military, her passing behavior is
undertaken to avoid the harshest consequences of difference, but passing,
154
covering, reverse covering, or any intentional “working” of identity all serve
the same essential purpose—to enhance career longevity and opportunities for
minorities by presenting one’s status-marker of identity in a particular way. At
bottom, however, each mode of presenting identity is done to achieve an

a gay sailor or soldier could theoretically self-identify as gay and cover by abstaining from sodomy.
Yoshino, supra note 19, at 843. This identification of a possible opportunity to cover is somewhat
unlikely, given that the military’s anti-homosexual policy states that, apart from acts, a member can
be separated for making a statement “that a reasonable person would believe was intended to
convey that a person engages in, attempts to engage in, or has a propensity to engage in homosexual
acts.” DoDD 1332.14, supra note 79, encl. 2, at E2.1.16. See also Military Personnel Manual, Separation
by Reason of Homosexual Conduct, at § 1910-148 (Apr. 25, 2005), available at http://buperscd.
technology.navy.mil/bup_updt/upd_CD/BUPERS/MILPERS/MilpersmanPDF_TOC.htm”. Still, it
is technically possible that Yoshino is correct, because federal policy guidance dictates that a
statement that one is a homosexual can be overcome as a basis for separation where the military
member demonstrates that he or she is not a person who engages in the conduct, notwithstanding
the statement. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (2000).
150. There are a number of ways to define this concept of identity pretense; Yoshino describes
passing as “secretly retaining” one’s underlying identity even as “she presents a separate face to the
outside world.” Yoshino, supra note 19, at 813.
151. If she engaged in same-sex sexual relations, she could be charged with violating a sexspecific crime like sodomy. See 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000) (codifying the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, Article 125). Even though Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), held that the Due Process
Clause protected adult, consensual, private same-sex sexual conduct from government intervention
or criminalization, the ruling has not led to the demise of Article 125. See United States v. Marcum,
60 M.J. 198, 206 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces applying the Lawrence
constitutional analysis to the military context where a soldier was convicted of “non-forcible
sodomy” in violation of Article 125, UCMJ, and stating: “In the military setting . . . an understanding
of military culture and mission cautions against sweeping constitutional pronouncements that may
not account for the nuance of military life.”) Consequently, the court reasoned that a “contextual, as
applied analysis, rather than facial review” of Article 125 was necessary to review convictions for
non-forcible sodomy, particularly in the military environment. Id. at 205. In the alternative, she could
be charged with a more generalized offense like conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman, 10
U.S.C. § 933 (2000) (codifying the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 133). Under military and
Navy policy, she could be additionally or instead administratively discharged. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)
(providing that, unless the conduct is a departure from their customary behavior, service members
“shall be separated” for engaging in homosexual conduct); Military Personnel Manual, supra note
149, Separation by Reason of Homosexual Conduct, at § 1910-148 (allowing separation based on
homosexual conduct, which can be proved through “credible information” such as a statement
conveying one’s orientation).
152. See supra notes 78–80.
153. Yoshino describes this type of passing strategy as “counterfeiting”—attending company
functions and making vague references to imply heterosexuality. Yoshino, supra note 19, at 812.
154. On the concept of working identity, see supra notes 15 and 20.
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assimilative effect.
Having or choosing to “work” one’s identity in the military clearly presents
challenges and problems. As the example above demonstrates, one of the
challenges has to do with the breadth of performance required, when multiple
differences exist across race, gender, sexuality, or other identity categories for a
155
single person. Not only is there the problem of how many strategies must be
deployed, but there are issues pertaining to what Carbado and Gulati have
identified as backfire and the dangerous interplay of stereotypes for persons
inhabiting multiple and interconnected identities.
Backfire describes a condition where co-workers regard the performing
156
individual’s behavior as manipulative or strategic. For example, a backfire
could occur if military members viewed the willingness of the above-described
officer to be a poster-child for military diversity in recruiting as a decision to
take unfair advantage of race and gender. The interplay-of-stereotypes issue
revolves around the danger that “taking steps to negate one kind of stereotype
157
will activate some other negative stereotype.” For example, a black, gay
woman could attempt to overcome claims of antisocial conduct created by her
race and gender difference by engaging in physical training or sporting activities
158
with co-workers. She could, however, be punished if she performs too well,
because this competence or talent could be interpreted as a proxy for
masculinity, which could cause some to question her sexual orientation.
These types of examples illustrate the complications of managing identities
involving interconnected categories of difference, and within a particularly
intractable social environment. As John Calmore has surmised, with regard to
negotiating race alone: “Performing blackness is neither romantic nor heroic. It
is a struggle. While racial performance furthers agency, it is neither autonomous
159
nor transcendent.” Still, outsiders massage identity in an effort to mold
difference into advantage, while remaining mindful that their choices are
constrained by the fact that one cannot escape belonging to groups with ascribed
160
traits, the presentation of which create reactions in others. The ultimate
problem—that within the military all of this identity work may be for naught—

155. The difficulties are understood as particularly harrowing when one considers the position of
intersectionality scholars that the social construction of identity is not a simple additive equation of
race, plus gender, plus class. Instead, inequality works across the categories in an “interactive and
multiplicative” manner. See Stacy De Coster & Karen Heiner, Crime at the Intersections: Race, Class,
Gender and Violent Offending, in THE MANY COLORS OF CRIME 138–39 (Ruth Peterson et al. eds., 2006)
(citation omitted); Darren L. Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and
the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 309–10 (2001)
(“Multidimensionality posits that the various forms of identity and oppression are ‘inextricably and
forever intertwined’ and that essentialist equality theories ‘invariably reflect the experiences of classand race-privileged’ individuals.”) (citation omitted).
156. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 15, at 1291.
157. Id. at 1292.
158. See RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 59–63, 85–91
(discussing social separations in the military based on race and gender, respectively).
159. Calmore, supra note 12, at 110 (citation omitted).
160. Harris, supra note 12, at 121–22 (discussing the distinction between attempting to “work”
identity and simply presenting one’s status marker of difference).
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is next considered.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Performance?
One of the central claims of this Article is that, at times, those identified by
multiple markers of difference, such as women of color, are subject to unsteady
and disparate promotion results, and that perhaps their identities factor into
161
these results. It only makes sense that these women would attempt to fit in to
their work environments in any reasonable way that would potentially signal
success. Within the area of promotions, in particular, Carbado and Gulati make
this point: “Employees who wish to be promoted have an incentive to take extra
actions to demonstrate that they have the qualities the employer values. This
incentive is especially strong within an institutional context in which the
162
employer is making decisions for scarce promotion slots.”
In the alternative, one could suggest that looking to promotion results
provides no insight into the management of identity and stereotypes within the
Services. This comment, however, seems unpersuasive for reasons beyond the
Carbado and Gulati explanation. First, the military, by its very nature, requires
all members to sublimate, to some extent, individual expressions for the
163
interests of morale and unit cohesion. Hence, at some level, all members are
164
performing or conforming to community norms. Second, as stated earlier,
some identity performances occur inadvertently, because all who are different
have their conduct judged against stereotypes. If one is unwilling to accept that
women and minorities (and those who are both) are somehow inherently less
worthy of promotion selection, it becomes necessary to consider what unique
factors may undermine the effectiveness of assimilative identity performances.
If minority members are actually working to mitigate the potential costs of
difference and fit in to the military environment, what then accounts for how
poorly men and women of color sometimes perform in promotion processes?
The answer has to do with how promotion processes work and the nature of
military institutions. Promotion boards are comparative processes designed to
evaluate and select those officers who have performed well enough to be

161. This is first a comment on the notion that, whether or not they attempt to work identity to
their advantage, all women and persons of color—by their very nature of existing within minority
identity categories—present a “performance identity.” See Harris supra note 12, at 121; see also
Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination By Proxy and the Future of Title
VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1177–79 (2004) (discussing alternatively that the choice to perform
identity may be an invisible decision or consciously undertaken). Additionally, belonging to
minority identity categories triggers at least unconscious bias on the part of some.
162. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Interactions at Work: Remembering David Charny, 17 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 13, 18 (2001).
163. See RAND SEXUAL ORIENTATION STUDY, supra note 3, at 288 (noting that the military defines
unit cohesion in terms of group loyalty and common purpose). See also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953) (“The essence of the military
service ‘is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the
service.’”)).
164. Whether the conduct works or not, junior personnel are encouraged to subscribe to tradition
and convention in order to facilitate improved vertical and horizontal relationships. See RAND
MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 60–63.
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promoted to the next higher rank. The boards consider complete service records,
which include one’s documented history of assignments, performance, awards,
training, education, etc. The primary method of assessing performance is the
performance evaluation. Some part of military performance evaluations
involves an attempt by reporting seniors (evaluating officers) to describe current
duties and assess the performance and potential of those officers being rated. In
165
the Navy these evaluations are Fitness Reports (FITREPs) and they not only
166
assign numerical scores over seven performance traits, but they also rank
individuals in comparison to others of the same rank who are working for that
167
evaluating officer. Each Service uses a unique evaluation system and form, but
168
all involve some type of narrative commentary that promotion boards weigh
169
heavily when selecting which officers will be promoted.
I have every confidence that the evaluating officers and board members
attempt to assess people of color and women in same fashion that they assess
170
white males. FITREPs and board deliberations, however, involve subjective
perceptions—perceptions that may unconsciously be affected by race and
gender bias. The board members themselves may not even be aware of the
harmful ways in which they are influenced by gender or race. A recent genderdiscrimination case involving a number of the Navy JAG Corps Commander
171
Promotion Boards considered in this Article makes the point.
In the case, a female lieutenant commander (Lt. Cmdr.) sued the Navy
based on comments made to her by a member of one of the boards that
172
considered her promotion to commander. Allegedly, a member of the 2001

165. For the Navy: “The FITREP includes a description of the current duties and responsibilities
of the officer, a physical readiness rating, a performance rating, comments describing the officer’s
performance . . . .” RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 112.
166. The seven traits are: professional expertise; command or organizational climate/equal
opportunity; military bearing/character; teamwork; mission accomplishment and initiative;
leadership; and tactical performance. Fitness Report and Counseling Record (E7-O6), NAVPERS
1610/2 (Rev. Mar. 2002) [hereinafter NAVPERS 1610/2], available at http://buperscd.technology.
navy.mil/bup_updt/upd_CD/BUPERS/FORMS/PDF/n1610_2.pdf. Officers are rated on a fivepoint scale, where 1 is “below standards” and 5 represents “greatly exceeds standards.” Id.
167. RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 112–13. Individuals
are assigned to one of the following promotion categories: early promote, must promote,
promotable, progressing, significant problems. Each FITREP displays the individual’s promotion
rating, and a summary for all officers of the same rank the reporting senior evaluates in that cycle.
NAVPERS 1610/2, supra note 166.
168. RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 111–16.
169. Id. at 112.
170. Certainly, however, service members have alleged intentional discrimination by superior
officers. See infra notes 276–279 and accompanying text (discussing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296
(1983)).
171. In the interest of full disclosure, it should be acknowledged that I know Elizabeth Miller, the
plaintiff in the case. We served in different divisions of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of
the Navy, in the early 2000s. However, I have neither spoken to her since that time nor was I aware
of her lawsuit.
172. Miller v. Dep’t of the Navy, 383 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2005) (alleging gender bias in the FY02, FY-03, and FY-04 Active Duty JAG Commander Boards), rev’d and remanded, 476 F.3d 936, 937–38
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding a “material error” in the Navy’s consideration of Lt. Cmdr. Miller’s claim
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board informed the female lieutenant commander that she “had been in a
‘difficult zone’ because there ‘were a lot of very competitive women in the zone’
173
that year.” Additionally, he opined that her promotion chances would be
better the following year “‘because the women in the prospective zone were
174
weaker.’” At some level, it appears that the board member’s comments were
designed to inform and console the affected officer, especially since he was
175
speaking of deliberations that are supposed to be confidential.
One
interpretation of his statement, however, is that he was considering women as a
class as vying for a limited or separate number of spots. In other words, this
female officer—Lt. Cmdr. Miller—was not competing with all officers for each
available slot, but only against women, for whom there were presumably a
176
smaller number of promotions available. To be promoted to one of these fewer
177
spots she would need to be one of the “best women.” As a result of the
comments, Lt. Cmdr. Miller alleged that the board was “not impartial” but
“prejudiced” in its deliberations and she requested a special selection board,
178
which the Secretary of the Navy denied. She sued to challenge the Secretary’s
decision. The trial court, citing to the “highly deferential” nature of military
179
180
promotion decisions, granted summary judgment to the Navy. The matter
181
has now been reversed and remanded for further action by the Navy.
The alleged bias operating in Lt. Cmdr. Miller’s case stems from the
method of comparison undertaken by at least one board member. Additionally,
bias may simply result from the nature of the documents presented to the board.
In a board, perceptions about a member can be communicated directly through

and remanding the matter to the district court for the application of the correct section of the
relevant regulation).
173. Miller, 476 F.3d at 937.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., FY-07 Active Duty Navy Commander JAG Precept supra note 132, at app. A, ¶2.d
(providing that members are not to reveal board deliberations). One of Lt. Cmdr. Miller’s complaints
referred to the board member violating the confidentiality oath by speaking with Lt. Cmdr. Miller.
Miller, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 11–12. This confidentiality was also the reason the court denied her
Freedom of Information Act request to see the deliberations of the boards. Id. at 17.
176. Plaintiff claimed that the board member “improperly ‘considered men and women
differently and as if they were not competing against each other, but rather just competing against
their own gender.’” Miller, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
177. This conduct strikes me as comparable to what Stephen Carter has termed the “best Black”
syndrome, which involves an employer hiring or promoting a black employee because he or she is
the best applicant of their race, rather than the best candidate overall. See STEPHEN L. CARTER,
REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 49 (1991). This philosophy both serves to suggest that
minorities cannot compete with non-minorities and to justify that the “token black is the only black
person needed.” Id. at 50–52. See also Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other
Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are
White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1315–16.
178. Miller, 476 F.3d at 937. According the Chief of Naval Personnel, her non-selection was based
upon “her failure to perform at a consistently outstanding level and to perform in arduous duty
assignments rather than a board with gender bias.” Miller, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
179. Miller, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
180. Id. at 12.
181. See supra note 172.
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a fitness report (FITREP) or indirectly through any document before the board
that serves to communicate the reputation of the candidate. Some reputation
data is more powerful, especially data that communicates opinions from
respected senior officers who serve as mentors. Mentors, who also happen to be
reporting seniors, can use FITREPs to communicate their high regard. Others
may write letters of recommendation to boards or intervene in careers to ensure
competitive assignments or deployment opportunities. Whatever their conduct,
182
they are perceived as critical to the careers of junior officers.
Based on the foregoing, should a woman of color deliberately choose to
“work” her identity, the purpose would be to ensure positive assessments are
reflected within service record documents—chiefly through performance
evaluations. Given the board results considered in this Article, it would seem
that assimilative conduct (intentional or not) is not a particularly effective
strategy for guaranteeing success within the military promotion system. Perhaps
it is the uniqueness of the military environment that renders assimilativeconduct plays less useful. “Working” one’s identity is about mitigating or
183
accentuating identity stereotypes,
which active duty personnel rarely
acknowledge or speak of as affecting military success. Instead, when officers
speak of enhancing (intangible) factors leading to career success, they
understand that a separate set of unspoken norms and considerations are
controlling. These considerations (most of which are not empirically tested) are
not finite, but can extend to such considerations as whether you attended a
184
service academy (or your commissioning source more generally), your
undergraduate or graduate institution, whether you have obtained an advanced
degree, your history of assignments (including whether you have served in a
joint or operational billet), and the decision to strategically cultivate
relationships with well-regarded and highly placed mentors. Having to manage
these considerations—several of which are unique to the military—may account
for why identity performances prove less effective within the environment.
Negotiating community norms that are unrelated to identity is a task that
185
everyone must manage at work. The military is just like many work
environments where, in addition to managing workplace norms, women and
minorities have to do some extra work—related to undermining identity
186
stereotypes—to succeed. Unlike other places, the military presents at least four
182. For instance, an Army study indicated that “most officers who did not have mentors had
shorter military careers, while those with strong mentors ascended to the higher levels of the field
grade ranks, and in many cases, even achieved the rank of general officer.” REYES, supra note 38, at 9.
Black officers serving as respondents in a study shared their perceptions that mentoring was critical
to success and that “it was less common for senior officers to mentor young black officers.” RAND
MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 60.
183. See supra notes 144–150 and accompanying text.
184. On the advantages that accrue to academy graduates, see RAND MINORITY AND GENDER
DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 8; REYES, supra note 38, at 10 (“Many black officers serving
during the early 1980s felt that officers commissioned by the United States Military Academy
(USMA), as opposed to the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) or the Officer Candidates School
(OCS), had an overwhelming advantage.” (citation omitted)).
185. See Green, supra note 134, at 634–40.
186. On the nature of this extra work, see Emily Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-Claiming the
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somewhat unique problems: (1) that despite being raced and gendered, the
environment is understood by most in the military and society to be unbiased
(an integration success); (2) that this attitude about equal treatment has found its
way into the performance evaluation and promotion processes; (3) that one’s
commitment to the military can be daunting as it is understood as larger than a
mere commitment to one’s work or profession and exists twenty-four hours a
187
day, seven days a week; and (4) that being a minority, especially a person
inhabiting multiple bases for subordination, makes it more difficult to negotiate
even the non-identity based norms. For an illustrative example, we can return to
our black, gay female officer, who (to be consistent with the Miller case
considered above and the board data reviewed in Part III.B), will be placed in
the Navy JAG Corps.
Despite a Service history of race and gender exclusion, and a current policy
188
that prevents women from serving in combat, the Navy enjoys the same
reputation as the other Services with regard to its integration success. This
means that there are fewer concerns about the types and amounts of
discrimination minorities and women face. Additionally, as we can see from the
equal opportunity language from the FY-07 Active Duty Navy JAG Commander
Promotion Board precept, the only comments on race and gender state in effect
189
that identity should not be used to disadvantage candidates. As such, officers
on promotion boards are neither given an opportunity to consider the effects of
past discrimination nor to search for the more subtle ways that race and gender
bias might currently be manifested (through assignments, lack of mentorship,
etc.). Further, if Lt. Cmdr. Miller is correct, and some board members place
women in competition against each other for fewer spots, this practice could be
190
especially detrimental for women of color.
Antidiscrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 455,
473 (2005) (“Thus identity work burdens outsiders . . . not only in that this work requires them to do
more on a physical, mental, and emotional level, but also because it causes them to incur work and
identity-related risks that their insider counterparts do not incur.”). See also Roberts & Roberts, supra
note 147, at 378 (noting that “[m]ost workers strategically enact their identities in order to signal to
employers that they possess the requisite technical and social competencies as well as the firm’s
desired character traits” and indicating that certain employees—those who engage in cultural
displays of identity—have to expend greater efforts to signal “competence and character”)
(alteration added).
187. Not surprisingly, it was this characteristic of service that legislators seized upon when
discussing why open service by gays and lesbians would be problematic. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(9)–
(10):
(9) The standards of conduct for members of the armed forces regulate a member’s life 24
hours each day beginning at the moment the member enters military status and not
ending until that person is discharged . . . .
(10) Those standards of conduct . . . apply to a member of the armed forces at all times that
the member has that status, whether the member is on or off base, and . . . on or off duty.
Id.
188. In the Navy, that is mostly limited to preventing her from serving on submarines, see supra
note 72, an environment where no lawyers are permanently assigned.
189. See supra note 132 (quoting the equal opportunity language in the precept).
190. On the one hand, if a board member “slots” not only women, but women of color, a black
woman might be understood as competing with other black women for very few or, perhaps, only
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With regard to community norms, her opportunities for success would be
improved if she attended the U.S. Naval Academy. Even if she were not an
academy graduate, part of her success more generally could depend on where
she graduated from college and law school, as she would potentially gain some
positive attention by having either attended undergraduate and graduate
institutions that are well-regarded or from which other senior officers—ones
191
who might choose to mentor her—have graduated. Importantly, she would
receive some advantage had she been selected into the JAG Corps through the
192
Navy’s Law Education Program (LEP). The advantage here is twofold: first,
the program selects from officers already in the Navy, so she would have been
commissioned through the Academy, the ROTC program, or Officer Candidate
School and have experience in another career field, often a line rather than staff
profession; and second, the program attempts to tap career officers, which
becomes another factor in deciding who should succeed more generally. If she is
not a LEP accession or someone with prior military experience coming back into
the service after funding her own legal career, then her introduction to the
military and JAG Corps will extend only to the more modest training and
indoctrination received by all persons whose first contact with the military is
193
through the selection programs used to recruit law school graduates. The
remainder of the community considerations, which relate to matters such as
194
quality of assignments and mentorship, are critical, because—unlike the

one black female slot. On the other hand, even a well-meaning board member might consider that
black women need not be regarded as having separate concerns from either women or racial
minorities—especially since the success narrative would predict the fair treatment of each of these
groups.
191. While no study of the effect of college/law school attended has been conducted for JAG
officers, a 1995 study of officer promotions in the Navy and Marine Corps determined that “officers
who graduated from more competitive institutions of higher learning, majored in technical subjects,
and had higher grades received more positive performance evaluations that led directly to higher
promotion rates to Lieutenant Commander.” RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY,
supra note 104, at 47. Graduating from a Historically Black College or University (HBCU) might hurt
her as well, given that these schools are lesser known. Charles Moskos claims that HBCU attendance
and the preparation provided at these institutions may explain the lower promotion rates for black
junior officers in the Army. See Moskos, supra note 5, at 17. It is not clear that this issue is equally
problematic in each Service. The Navy, for instance, has very few ROTC units at HBCUs. MOSKOS &
BUTLER, supra note 7, at 138 (footnote omitted). By contrast, as of the mid-1990s, HBCUs had
produced nearly half of the black officers in the Army. Id. at 135.
192. Each Service offers a funded legal education program. For the Navy’s program, see Navy
Law Education Program, SECNAVINST 1520.7F (Sept. 6, 2002), available at http://dodssp.
daps.mil/Directives/1520_7F.pdf. For information on the Army’s funded legal education program,
see Judge Advocate Legal Services, Army Regulation 27-1, at 37–41 (Oct. 30, 1996), available at
http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r27_1.pdf.
193. The Navy JAG Corps selects new accessions for their Student Program from among
students enrolled in law school. They also select law graduates through their Direct Appointment
Program. For information on these programs, see The Official Web Site of the United States Navy
JAG, Careers, http://www.jag.navy.mil/Careers/CareersHowToApply3.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2007).
194. The concept of “good” is relative and shifting. In the recent past, “good assignments”
included those jobs with significant responsibilities, certain operational jobs, positions in a joint
environment, and overseas positions. In interviews conducted in one study, “many black officers
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matters discussed immediately above—they involve matters open to an ongoing
process of negotiation throughout one’s career. Unfortunately, they are also the
types of considerations for which identity difference may be the most punitive.
On the surface, all of these community considerations are race- and genderneutral. This, however, is misleading. Some of the keys to promotion success
revolve around other types of selections. First, unless the academies and
programs such as LEP or the funded postgraduate legal education (LL.M.)
program select women of color in sufficient numbers—or more consistently than
195
promotion boards—black women will be at a systemic disadvantage. Second,
many of the other conditions of success are silently identity-dependent. For
instance, mentoring depends on our black, female and closeted lesbian being
selected by someone as a mentee. While empirical data on interracial mentoring
196
is thin, black officers certainly perceive that mentoring relationships are more
difficult to form because they require “that the [commanding officer] has to see
197
himself as a young [officer] in you.” Identity differences make this vision hard
to come by. To the extent minority officers attempt to “work” identity, it is as a
198
part of negotiating the necessary social relationships that all officers need, but
minority officers believe they must struggle to create. Hence, not only do
minorities have to manage the norms and considerations that all officers do, but
they also have to manage the myriad elements of identity—some of which also
affect the aforementioned norms and considerations. It would seem to follow
course that the greater one’s differences from norms, the more work one must
do. When one considers that the need for this identity work can be continuous,
requiring officers to censor themselves at work and beyond (to make sure that
unacceptable or unappreciated behaviors are not reported back to military
authorities), it is no wonder that performance wilts or loses strength under this
burden. That the work must be done at all, however, signals at least one way
that the integration success story is oversimplified and therefore should be
subject to continued interrogation.
B. A Promotion Data “Snapshot” and the Limits of Integration Success
Part III.A was about the ways in which minority and women service
members must do extra work to achieve the success that many would assume
the organization freely facilitates. This Part uses selection board data for Navy
JAG Commander promotions to suggest how difficult it can be to achieve that
success. Related to the larger aims of this Article, this Part places the integration
success narrative into focus by shifting from looking at the significant numbers

expressed a sense that they are often shut out of career-enhancing assignments.” RAND MINORITY
supra note 104, at 63.
195. In the twelve-plus years I spent on active duty in the U.S. Navy, I met one AfricanAmerican, female commander in the JAG Corps, who was an academy graduate, a LEP accession,
and who received a funded LL.M. She has since retired. Information on the Navy’s fully funded
legal education (LL.M.) program is contained in JAGINST. 1520.1A (Oct. 7, 2005).
196. RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 63.
197. Id. at 60–61 (alterations added).
198. See supra note 182.

AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY,
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of all minorities and women within the Services generally to concentrating on
promotion success for some officers, specifically. While promotion rates for
enlisted members are also important, they do not reveal vertical success (the
success of minorities at integrating the highest levels of military senior
leadership). Focusing on senior-level officer promotions makes sense for a
number of reasons. First, military sociologists have surmised that “[t]he quickest
way to dispel stereotypes of black incapacity is to bring white people into
199
contact with highly qualified Afro-American leaders.” Second, the accession
and promotion rates for enlisted persons of color are typically superior to those
200
numbers for the officer ranks, so in ways the officer population—at least with
regard to its representation and success—is a riper population for study.
Moreover, the military practices a form of “up or out” policy, whereby enlisted
and officer members who fail to promote in a timely manner may be
201
discharged. For officers, the timing is more severe. At any rank, those who
twice fail to select for promotion to the next higher grade “shall be involuntarily
202
released from active duty . . . .” Finally, looking at promotions at the critical
juncture where an officer moves from a junior to a senior officer, may reveal
203
how race and gender function as a glass ceiling, especially with regard to
persons inhabiting multiple identity categories.
The analysis of data that follows is designed to serve as a qualitative
snapshot of the types of uneven results that can occur in a color- and genderblind promotion world. It is not meant as an overarching comment on identity

199. See MOSKOS & BUTLER, supra note 7, at 135.
200. See id. at 44–47 (discussing the promotion success of black Non-Commissioned Officers);
Moore, supra note 59, at 130–31 (detailing decreasing numbers for black women among the lower
enlisted ranks, but increases among the senior enlisted in the late 1980s).
201. Within some career fields, the board that considers promotion to the O-5 rank also considers
which of the O-4s who have failed to promote will be retained on active duty. This is the case in the
Navy JAG Corps. See supra note 132; see also The United States Military, Officer Rank Insignia,
http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/insignias/officers.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007) (illustrating
hierarchy of officer ranks in the U.S. Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Marines, and Air Force). The
Services have varied up or out policies for enlisted members. In the Navy, enlisted members who are
promoted to Third Class Petty Officer (E-4) may remain on active duty for eight years; enlisted
members who are promoted to Second Class Petty Officer (E-5) may remain until fourteen years;
and those who are promoted to First Class Petty Officer (E-6) may remain twenty years—which
renders them retirement eligible. See Military Personnel Manual, supra note 149, High Year Tenure,
at § 1160.120; see also The United States Military, Enlisted Rank Insignia, http://www.defense
link.mil/specials/insignias/enlisted.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007) (illustrating hierarchy of enlisted
service member ranks in the U.S. Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Marines, and Air Force).
202. 10 U.S.C. § 6383 (2000). For an example of a policy implementing the statute within the
Navy, see SECNAVINST 1920.7B (Jan. 30, 2006). See also Military Personnel Manual, supra note 149,
Involuntary Release from Active Duty of Reserve Officers, at § 1920-110. Cf. Kathleen T. Rhem, Upor-Out Personnel Policy “Lousy Idea,” Rumsfeld Tells Sailors, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE (online ed.),
Nov. 15, 2003, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2003/n11152003_200311156.html.
The statute, however allows a Service-specific administrative board to retain some number of
officers who have been twice passed over. See 10 U.S.C. § 6383.
203. One study has determined that this circumstance is certainly true as one progresses up the
senior ranks. See Hall, supra note 22, at 155 (discussing a 1995 GAO report finding that despite
predictions that minorities would be represented at the senior officer level, no such representation
occurred and that “there was a ‘glass ceiling’ for Blacks in the upper ranks”).
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politics and promotions for the entire military, although there is some data to
204
suggest a larger problem than is presented here. There is, however, value in
looking at promotion statistics for a specific career field (designator or Military
Occupational Specialty) within a single Service. Concentrating on such a
population allows one to demonstrate how broader population statistics for the
Services can obscure certain race and gender effects in sub-populations. This is
stated to suggest that, if one were to only look at the numbers for women and
minorities in the Services, in general, they would appear more favorable than if
we separate the total numbers into statistics for enlisted service members on
205
206
active duty, and the smaller group comprising minority officers. It is also
very likely that looking at the data for all officers in all services would obscure
207
numerical disparities within a particular force. Additionally, the court that
issued the opinion dictating how race and gender can be considered by military
promotion boards suggested that the most compelling evidence would not only
be service-specific, but specific to particular boards within specific career
208
fields. Finally, to analyze a broader swath of numbers, career fields, and
services than is reviewed here would require a larger scale research project,
209
which is beyond the scope of this Article. This data is not presented as
empirical proof of the utter lack of opportunity for women and people of color
that exists in the military. Instead, it is presented to suggest problems with the
types of statistics the forces keep, and most importantly, that it would be
premature to use the integration success narrative as a basis to justify colorblind

204. See RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 25, 44–45
(discussing studies which indicate certain black and female officers in the Navy and Marine Corps
were less likely to be selected to Lieutenant Commander, Lieutenant, and Lieutenant (Junior
Grade)). The study analyzed officer career promotion and retention using interviews and analysis of
selected personnel records from 1967 to 1994 to compare minority and female officers to white male
officers. Id. at 4.
205. For instance, for the fiscal year ending September 2005, the minority numbers for enlisted
military active duty forces and the Coast Guard were as follows: Blacks, 19.1% (225,310); Hispanics,
9.8% (115,528); Asian-American/Pacific Islanders, 4.7% (55,321); American Indian/Alaskan Native
1.9% (22,822); and Multi-racial/Unknown, 2.7% (328). ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE, supra note 5,
at 2. For the same time period, analysis by gender (and not race) reveals that enlisted women
constituted 169,187 of a total enlisted force of 1,179,233. Id. at 2, 8.
206. For officers, however, the numbers were as follows: Blacks, 8.9% (20,915); Hispanics, 4.9%
(11,524); Asian-American/Pacific Islanders, 4.1% (9,523); American Indian/Alaskan Native 0.8%
(1,915); and Multi-racial/Unknown, 3.5% (8,273). ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE, supra note 5, at 2.
For the same time period for gender, not separating by race, female officers constituted 35,867 of a
total enlisted force of 233,949. Id. at 2, 8.
207. Compare the minority numbers for officers in general, see supra note 5, to the number of
Asian American/Pacific Islander female officers in the U.S. Coast Guard (0.2% or two officers) or
black officers in the U.S. Air Force and the Marine Corps (6.4% for each force; 4,702 persons in the
Air Force and 1,208 persons in the Marine Corps, respectively). ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE,
supra note 5, at 2, 8.
208. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the finding of the court in Saunders v.
White, 191 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D.D.C. 2002), that race and gender statistics for the entire Army officer
corps were unsuitable to justify race and gender considerations at the Army JAG Corps Lt. Col.
board).
209. In the future, I would like to conduct the analysis for other promotions within the JAG
Corps, or other operational or staff communities within the Navy.

01__BARNES.DOC

6/18/2007 2:59 PM

“BUT SOME OF [THEM] ARE BRAVE”

733

promotion and retention policies.
1. Navy JAG Active Duty Commander Promotions
This subsection will discuss statistics for a particular promotion board, over
a series of years for men of color and women in the Judge Advocate General’s
(JAG) Corp of the U.S. Navy. The Navy JAG Corps is selected primarily because
210
211
of its manageable size, nature of the community, and the fact that the
relevant statistics were quickly obtainable. The Commander Board (Lieutenant
Commander to Commander promotion) is selected because it is a critical
promotion in a number of ways. First, this promotion marks a move from midlevel to senior leadership within the Corps and Service, more generally—a point
where some data suggests there tends to be a drop off in minority success in
212
other services. Second, the promotion to O-5 strongly signals those individuals
who will seek to be career officers.
Turning to the promotion statistics for the most recent promotion selection
process at the time of the writing of this Article—the Fiscal Year 2007 (FY-07)
Active Duty Commander Selection Board—the precept from the Secretary of the
213
Navy authorized the Board to select 66.7% of eligible officers. Table 1 shows
214
the results of the FY-07 Selection Board. In order to assess whether officers are
promoting in a timely fashion, the “In Zone” data on Table 1 are the most
215
critical.

210. As of August 2005, there were approximately 735 Navy Judge Advocates (officers) on active
duty, including 208 women (28.3%) and ninety-four officers who designate themselves as minorities
(12.8%). The Official Website of the United States Navy JAG, Careers, FAQs, UNITED STATES NAVY
Careers: FAQ, http://www.jag.navy.mil/Careers/FAQS.doc (“3. How Many Attorneys Are There in
the Navy JAG Corps and What Are Their Demographics?”) (last visited Feb. 26, 2007). The most
recent data from the NALP Directory of Legal Employers entry for the Navy JAG Corps provides
slightly different and more detailed information. As of February 1, 2006, the entry indicates there are
744 attorneys (including 208 women), with the minority numbers as follows: 47 Blacks (33 men, 14
women); 45 Hispanics (35 men, 10 women); 4 American Indian/Alaskan (all men); 31 Asian and
Pacific Islanders (22 men, 9 women). The NALP entry is available at http://www.nalpdirectory.
com/dledir_search_results.asp?fscid=G100201&yr=2006&orgtypeid=G (last visited May 1, 2007).
211. As a staff corps, rather than a line (combat) community, there are very few positions that
would be restricted due to the prohibition on women in combat. As such, the career assignments of
female officers substantially approximate those of their male counterparts.
212. REYES, supra note 38, at 1 (discussing studies that show for officers, black representation
decreases as rank increases, especially as one approaches field grade and general officer ranks).
213. The FY-07 Board guidance or precept is discussed in note 132, supra.
214. The results of the board are contained in FY-07 Navy Commander Staff Promotion selection
board, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Zone Statistics, Mar. 30, 2006 (on file with author)
[hereinafter FY-07 Navy JAG Commander Board Statistics]. A version of the board statistics is
available at http://www.npc.navy.mil/Boards/ActiveDutyOfficer/05Staff/FY07Board/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2007). However, this version does not include race or gender data. Race and gender
information must be requested from the Navy Personnel Command. The board statistics in Table 1,
infra, include race and gender data.
215. The phrase “In Zone” refers to those officers receiving their first look at promotion, in the
normal time frame expected for that promotion. There are two additional categories for
consideration by the selection board: “Above Zone” and “Below Zone.” The “Above Zone” category
is comprised of those officers who have been considered (“In Zone”) at a previous selection board,
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TABLE 1. FY-07 NAVY COMMANDER STAFF PROMOTION SELECTION BOARD
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, ZONE STATISTICS
OVERALL STATISTICS
Above Zone
Desig

In Zone

Below Zone

Total

Elg

Sel

Pct

Elg

Sel

Pct

Elg

Sel

Pct

Elg

Sel

Pct

2500

41

3

7.32

30

17

56.67

43

0

0.00

30

20

66.67

Total

41

3

7.32

30

17

56.67

43

0

0.00

30

20

66.67

FEMALE STATISTICS
Above Zone
Desig

In Zone

Below Zone

Total

Elg

Sel

Pct

Elg

Sel

Pct

Elg

Sel

Pct

Elg

Sel

Pct

2500

11

0

0.00

12

7

58.33

9

0

0.00

12

7

58.33

Total

11

0

0.00

12

7

58.33

9

0

0.00

12

7

58.33

STATISTICS BY RACE
Above Zone

In Zone

Below Zone

Total

Desig

Elg

Sel

Pct

Elg

Sel

Pct

Elg

Sel

Pct

Elg

Sel

Pct

Asian

0

0

0.00

1

1

100.00

0

0

0.00

1

1

100.00

Black/Afr. Am.

4

0

0.00

4

0

0.00

1

0

0.00

4

0

0.00

Hispanic/Latino

5

1

20.00

3

0

0.00

5

0

0.00

3

1

33.33

Multiple Race

1

0

0.00

0

0

0.00

0

0

0.00

0

0

0.00

Total

10

1

10.00

8

1

12.50

6

0

0.00

8

2

25.00

For all of the officers “In Zone,” 56.7% or (seventeen of thirty) were selected
216
for promotion from Lieutenant Commander to Commander. The numbers for
women, generally, were consistent with the overall selection rate, with 58.3%
217
(seven of twelve) of the “In Zone” women being selected. Only, however,
without being selected. Officers in the “Below Zone” category will have their record briefed to the
selection board, but are considered early for promotion. The Army has defined these categories as
follows:
Roughly speaking the “promotion zone” [in zone] refers to a level of experience normally
commensurate with promotion to a higher grade. Candidates “above the zone” are
candidates who have already been considered for promotion and denied. Candidates
“below the zone” are candidates who show particular promise for early promotion. . .
[despite the short length of their experience in the Army].
Saunders v. White, 191 F. Supp. 2d 95, 122 n.33 (D.D.C. 2002) (alteration added).
216. Since three of the forty-one officers from the “Above Zone” group were selected, the
selection board lists a total selection rate of 66.7% (twenty of thirty selected). This methodology
seems somewhat unusual. Since seventeen of thirty were selected from “In Zone” and three of fortyone were selected from “Above Zone,” it seems that the more accurate total would be that twenty of
seventy-one were selected. See FY-07 Navy JAG Commander Board Statistics, supra note 215 & supra
Table 1. To be most accurate, however, it would make sense to list only the separate zone selection
rates, which then would be 56.7% for those “In Zone” and 7.3% of those persons in the “Above
Zone” category. It is likely that this methodology of basing the percentage of the total number
selected on the number of persons eligible “In Zone,” regardless of the category of the selectee, is the
only way to prevent “Above Zone” and “Below Zone” selectees from significantly upsetting the
selection rate authorized in the precept.
217. FY-07 Navy JAG Commander Board Statistics, supra note 215 & supra Table 1. This is
somewhat consistent with other promotion studies finding that white women were “only [seven]
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12.5% (one of eight) of the eligible race/ethnic minority officers were selected
218
for promotion from Lieutenant Commander to Commander.
The race and gender promotion selection statistics analyzed here are
problematic in at least two ways. First, the numbers reflect a disparate result
between an impoverished selection rate for racial minorities and a strong
selection rate for women generally. Separately, there is an “intersectionality” or
erasure problem, in that the statistics do not specify results along a gender/race
219
intersection. If one were to look at these promotion statistics and consider the
success of women of color by looking at the numbers for gender selection, he or
she might assume that minority women fared well. If they assessed the success
of women of color, however, by looking at the selection rates for minorities, they
could conclude only that the promotion results were disastrous. Most persons
looking at the results then would have no ability to discern the success of
220
women of color, in particular. In looking to the list of officers who were
eligible (“In Zone”) for promotion, through prior assignments and personal
affiliations, I recognized three women who self-identified as African-American
221
and another as Hispanic.
Using this knowledge and the document
222
promulgating the names of the selectees, I was able to decipher that, while
fifty-eight percent (seven of twelve) women were selected, at least four eligible
women of color were not. Given that only five women failed the selection

percent more likely to fail promotions . . . .” RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY,
supra note 104, at xv–xvi (alteration added).
218. FY-07 Navy JAG Commander Board Statistics, supra note 215 & supra Table 1. The one Asian
officer “In Zone” who was considered was selected, resulting in a promotion rate of 100.0% for
Asians. None of the four black/African-American officers or the three Hispanic/Latinos “In Zone”
was selected. Of the ten persons of color—four black/African Americans, five Hispanic/Latinos, and
one multiple race individual—that were considered in the “Above Zone” category, one
Hispanic/Latin was selected. Based on this additional selection, the statistics again list a total
percentage of 25.0%, based on two of eight minorities being selected. See FY-07 Navy JAG
Commander Board Statistics, supra note 215 & supra Table 1. Again, for clarity, I maintain the more
accurate method would be to list zone statistics of a 10.0% selection rate (one of ten) of the “Above
Zone” group and a 12.5% (one of eight) for the “In Zone” group.
219. While the promotion statistics do not include a combined race and gender category, the
DEOMI statistics reflecting the number of women and minorities on active duty in the Services
include gender numbers for each racial group. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
220. As others have indicated, while researchers tend to focus on the effects of gender and the
effects of race, we forget that some women are also racial minorities. See ALL THE WOMEN, supra note
26, at xxi; Katzenstein & Reppy, supra note 21, at 13 (describing the work of contributor Gwen Hall
as follows: “Hall reminds us that groups at the intersection of commonly recognized social identities
(Blacks and women) are often rendered invisible in the institution’s self-reporting, making it difficult
for such groups to know how they stand vis-à-vis others in similar employ and to apprehend what
may be their very distinct experiences.” (emphasis in original)).
221. For each promotion board, the Bureau of Personnel promulgates a list of eligible candidates,
annotating which members are “In Zone,” “Above Zone,” and “Below Zone.” The list of FY-07
candidates discussed here is on file with the author and was, at the time of this writing, available at:
http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/5C2A4FB0-DDA3-41D5-99123DFE044CAF32/0/FY07ActO5JAGLOE.txt (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
222. FY-07 Active Duty Navy Commander Staff Corps Selection, http://www.npc.navy.mil/
NR/rdonlyres/0AC83B28-BF0D-4545-BB25-023D1E41D093/0/ALN06058.txt (last visited Feb. 26,
2007).
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process, the numbers for women (and men) of color are deplorable—at least
eighty percent of eligible women of color were not selected. Of course, most
people look at the data without having this type of information, and it is not
223
provided in the released statistics.
One might attribute the disproportionately small selection numbers for
people of color to their generally small numbers within the community—e.g.,
since only eight of the thirty “In Zone” officers were racial minorities to begin
with, the total number of officers selected is very likely to be modest. Such a
claim does not explain why the percentage selection rate for racial minorities
224
would be so different from that of their white counterparts. Also, given that
225
another minority group—women —often select in numbers at or near the
overall promotion rate for the “In Zone” group, that there are small numbers of
“In Zone” minority candidates does not necessarily explain the disparate
selection outcomes. Moreover, given that the numbers of racial minorities the
226
selection board considered are not particularly anomalous for the JAG Corps,
accepting the “small population” charge as a reason not to analyze poor
minority selection rates would be tantamount to admitting there are too few
persons of color within the Navy JAG Corps to warrant assessing and
attempting to improve their conditions.
As a way of assessing the typicality of the promotion statistics for Fiscal
Year 2007, the promotion statistics for the preceding several years were
analyzed to see whether they contained similar results. If the goal were to make
general claims about the significance of gender and race identity to military
promotion selection, looking to only several earlier Navy JAG Selection Boards
227
would be of limited usefulness. The data, however, can serve as a critical
snapshot of the types of results that occur in particular career fields in any given
year, when no attention is paid to meaningful race- or gender-consciousness in a
228
raced and gendered environment. Also, such results might serve to illuminate
223. The individual board members likely know the race and gender of each eligible service
member because such information is included in the member’s file. It is not clear, however, whether
the board keeps and internally reports numbers for women of color.
224. This difference between minority officer selection percentages and the overall selection rate,
seems to be a problem the Army routinely encountered or anticipated. The Army’s solution—
formerly requiring boards to re-vote and explain when minority percentages were off—were the
policies challenged as discriminatory in Saunders. See supra notes 110–113 and accompanying text.
225. For the FY-07 Selection Board, the group of “successful women” mostly meant “white
women.” See supra note 217.
226. For the FY-06 Selection Board, there were six persons of color among the “In Zone”
population of forty eligible officers; for the previous years, the numbers were as follows: FY-05 (4 of
37); FY-04 (1 of 23); FY-03 (5 of 23). Letter from Department of the Navy, Navy Personnel Command
(PERS 00J/20070046) to Amanda Frazer (Dec. 1, 2006) (responding to FOIA request containing
Commander Selection Board results for fiscal years 2003 through 2006) (on file with author).
227. To make such a claim would require data collection on a much larger scale. For instance, we
would need to look at the promotion results for the Navy JAG Corps over a much greater period of
time or analyze more communities of naval officers or more services.
228. For officer perceptions on how race matters in the military, see RAND MINORITY AND
GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 49–73; for a similar commentary on gender, including
the “double-jeopardy” affecting black women, see id. at 75–101, and Mitchell, supra note 17, at 36
(discussing the gender lie: “the notion that because intentions are ‘good’ and standards are ‘gender
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an issue that very few persons outside of the military seem to recognize as a
problem: sporadically poor promotion opportunities for men and, especially,
229
women of color. The goal then is to use the data to support a normative
commentary on how race and gender, and the intersection thereof, may
unconsciously figure into opportunities for success.
With regard to analyzing the previous years’ selection boards, the data was
very illuminating. Rather than revealing a consistent or hardened pattern of
consistently poor promotion opportunities, the data was both more positive and
uneven than one might imagine given the FY-07 data. For instance, for FY-06,
the selection rate for all “In Zone” officers was 62.5% (twenty-five of forty); for
women the rate was 66.7% (eight of twelve); and for persons of color 66.7% (four
of six, where the four selected were one Hispanic/Latino, two Asians, and one
230
multiple-raced person).
For FY-06, given that the rates for women and minorities were greater than
the overall selection rate for officers “In Zone,” one could argue that color- and
gender-blindness work and there is no need for special considerations related to
race and gender. FY-05, however, substantially mimics FY-07, in that the
selection rates for women were superior to the overall selection rate, but the
numbers for persons of color were not nearly so successful—only one of four
were selected—and it was not clear how women of color fared. The story of FY04 was that there was an incredibly small population of women and people of
color eligible within the zone. Only three women and one person of color were
considered, with only one woman being selected for promotion. For FY-03,
52.2% (twelve of twenty-three) of those eligible “In Zone” were selected, while
60.0% of women (three of five) and 40.0% of minorities (two of five, not listed by
constituent races) were also selected. Facially, these statistics certainly confirm
that there is no quota for minority promotions. They also confirm that the
promotion rates for women have typically approximated those for men in recent
boards, but that people of color—including women who are racial minorities—
have enjoyed varying degrees of success.
When looking to the most specific sub-categories, even greater concerns
emerge. In addition to the difficulty that arises in tracking the specific fates of
women of color, certain racial groups appear to be faring more poorly over the
231
observed boards. For FY-04 through FY-07, of the six black/African American

blind,’ there cannot be any gendered tension in the military except in the pathological thinking of a
female malcontent.”).
229. One study found that, relative to white men, white women had a seven percent greater
chance of failing to promote, while black men had a twenty-nine percent greater chance and black
women had a thirty-nine percent greater chance. RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY,
supra note 104, at 46. While the report typically limits discussions of minority results to black
officers, it provided the following more inclusive commentary: “Other minority officers could be
assessed only in the earlier career stages and through analysis of their promotion records . . . .
Overall, their retention and promotion patterns resembled those of their African American
counterparts.” Id. at 105.
230. FY-06 Navy Commander Staff Promotions Selection Board, Judge Advocate General’s
Corps, Zone Statistics (Mar. 31, 2005) (on file with author).
231. No individual race data was available for FY-03.
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officers eligible “In Zone,” only one was selected for promotion. In that time
period, additionally, one of the fourteen black officers considered from the
“Above Zone” category was selected, for a total of two black Navy JAG
commanders in the past four years. For Hispanic/Latinos, during the same
time-frame, two of nine “In Zone” officers were selected and two of thirteen
“Above Zone” officers, for a total of four Hispanic/Latino officers in four years
were selected. For Asians, three of the three officers considered were selected for
promotion during the four year period; no Asians were within the “Above
Zone” category.
2. Deciphering the Data: Of Missing Categories and Low Sample Sizes
Given the decision to look at one promotion for one career field and the
small numbers of people of color within that field, it would be imprudent to
make large general claims about the Navy JAG Corps promotions based on the
above data. Several narrow and largely descriptive claims, however, appear to
be supportable. On the one hand, the very uneven promotion results should
confirm for those who worry about the sub-rosa implementation of race and
gender quotas that the system is not rigged in this way. The results, however,
expose a number of problems. First, as previously mentioned, the methods used
to gather data do not provide those concerned with an opportunity to measure
the success of women of color. Second, these data bring to mind a problem
experienced by the University of California when it ended the consideration of
race in admissions. By comparison, when the California voters and the
232
University’s Board of Regents ended affirmative action in that state, many saw
it as deplorable that colorblind admissions resulted in only one AfricanAmerican student enrolling at the University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall
233
School of Law in 1997. Like the military, the University of California has
endured sporadic minority admission numbers since the law mandated a race234
neutral selection system. However, the University has undertaken measures—
principally related to minority recruitment—that have prevented a return of
these initially drastic results, which first followed the implementation of

232. On November 5, 1996, fifty-four percent of California voters voted to adopt Proposition 209,
otherwise known as the “California Civil Rights Initiative.” See Coalition for Economic Equity v.
Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that Proposition 209 does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997). Proposition 209 prohibits
discrimination and racial and gender preferences in public employment, public education, and
public contracting. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31, cl. a.
The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual
or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting.
Id.
233. Jerome Karabel, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action at the University of California, 25 J.
BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., 109, 109–12 (1999); Suzanne E. Eckes, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs:
Where do Universities Go From Gratz and Grutter?, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 21, 58 (2004). That student had been
selected in the year prior to the implementation of Proposition 209 and had elected to defer
admission by one year.
234. See ANDREA GUERRERO, SILENCE AT BOALT HALL: THE DISMANTLING OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
170–72 (2002).
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Proposition 209. Finally, while the data are not large or robust enough to
empirically prove the operation of unconscious bias and discrimination, they
should cause us to worry about the opportunities for women and people of color
and to be vigilant to challenge an overstated narrative of integration success.
The remainder of this Article articulates how the various military services,
should they be so inclined, might seek to prevent the types of promotion
disparities evinced in the results of the FY-07 Navy Active Duty JAG
Commander Promotion Board. To undermine such results, the Services will
have to place to rest the purported success stories that society has embraced
with regard to the organization’s history of integration. In other words, the
military may need to return to some more specially tailored measures of raceand gender-conscious promotion considerations, and to do so, they will need to
articulate for courts and the citizenry why it is necessary. Currently, the
maintenance of colorblindness and the prevalence of the narrative of integration
success prevent the undertaking of this needed work. Moreover, the
narratives—like the promotion results—present stories that fail to explore the
conditions of individuals who exist at the nexus of race and gender difference.
Separate from the above-reviewed Navy JAG Corps data, broader studies
of promotion success rates for black female line officers from 1967 to 1991
235
indicate that they were the “least likely to be promoted at all stages,” and that
some described themselves as “doubly disadvantaged in the same ways as black
236
men and white women.” Hence, the very positive racial integration narrative
and the somewhat less positive story for gender fail to represent the especially
tenuous position of women of color—they who are “brave.” The whole point of
presenting the promotions statistics in this Part has been to expose the shaky
truth of the integration narratives and to support a return to identity-conscious
promotion processes.
IV. DEFENDING IDENTITY CONSCIOUSNESS:
REVISITING THE CASES AND RESURRECTING DEFERENCE?
When President Truman issued the Executive Order that begins this
Article, it also included text mandating that promotions would be decided
237
“solely on merit and fitness.” This is ironic, because such a directive can be
used to argue for identity-conscious and identity-blind policies. For instance,
“merit and fitness” alone could be interpreted to mean that there is no room for
the consideration of race or gender. To the contrary, the words could be
understood as a directive to avoid the vestiges of racial discrimination in such
selections. This latter interpretation certainly makes sense for a number of
238
reasons related to the history of explicit discrimination that existed at the time.

235. RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 105.
236. Id. (emphasis in the original).
237. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948).
238. History tells us that, at the time the Order was issued, “[a]ttacks on Black Soldiers by
military and civilian police and by white civilians and soldiers were common, especially in the
South. In general, the norms and cultural codes of the wider society were reflected in the military.”
A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 27, at 67. These discriminatory policies “led to many nonviolent and
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The point of the integration success narratives is to represent that the
disparate conditions that existed at the time the Order was issued have
239
improved. The military is not, however, a race or gender utopia. There is a
continuum from the deliberate racism and sexism of past decades to the
unconscious bias that now may be partially responsible for the disparate success
experienced by some. The problem is not likely deliberate malfeasance but
rather a culture where identity makes it hard for one to truly obtain insider
status and this status signifies being marked for success. As recent studies have
confirmed:
(1) the magnitude of implicit bias toward members of outgroups or
disadvantaged groups is large, (2) implicit bias often conflicts with conscious
attitudes, endorsed beliefs, and intentional behavior, (3) implicit bias influences
evaluations of and behavior toward those who are the subject of the bias, and (4)
self, situational, or broader cultural interventions can correct systematic and
240
consensually shared implicit bias.

Rectifying the problem in the military is made all the more difficult because
“[n]either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 nor the equal employment
opportunity or affirmative action regulations of the Equal Employment
241
Opportunity Commission apply to active-duty military officers.” Before the
problem can be addressed, however, its existence has to be acknowledged. If the
problem exists, however, then the military cannot be completely regarded as the
integration success that many see it as. Herein lies the critical conflict—
preserving the integration narratives in the face of known and continuing
gender and race inequalities.
Even placing the recent Navy JAG Commander promotion statistics to one
side, it is clear from entry and promotion statistics of enlisted and officer service
members, that minority women—African Americans in particular—as opposed
to their numbers in the population, are overrepresented and underappreciated
242
in the Services. At least one scholar surmises that it just may be that their
experience with so-called inclusion is noticeably different, and if so, this clearly
243
evinces the need for conducting research on intersectional women. Compiling
such statistics would also be of help in convincing a court of the nature of the
problem and the need for identity-conscious remedies.
If the military is to begin both to study the effects of intersectional identities
on success and to reinstitute stronger identity-conscious policies, it will have to
violent confrontations between [B]lacks and [W]hites, but at home and in European and Asian
theaters of War.” Id. (alterations added).
239. See Moskos, supra note 5, at 16.
240. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative
Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006) (citations omitted).
241. RAND MINORITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES STUDY, supra note 104, at 1 (alteration added).
The Supreme Court has not weighed in, but the circuits have definitively rejected the application of
Title VII to active duty military personnel. See, e.g., Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir.
1996) (“As the district court correctly recognized, every federal court of appeal that has addressed
the issue has held that Title VII does not apply to uniformed members of the military.”).
242. Hall, supra note 22, at 144–46.
243. Id. at 144.
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do so in a manner that can withstand judicial scrutiny. Given that the Supreme
Court has not weighed in, there are at least three ways to move forward: (1)
244
using the initial decision from a case such as Berkley v. United States to advance
245
an argument that the Saunders court was incorrect; (2) accepting Saunders as
correct and amassing data to argue that the standard laid out can be met based
on numbers such as those presented in the promotion data cited above; or (3)
arguing deference to the military requires the Court to refrain from upsetting
military equal opportunity policies and language.
A. Arguing Saunders as Incorrect
Given that Saunders is not the only case to make a pronouncement about
the military’s former promotion language, there is room to argue that there was
no need to so dramatically move away from identity-conscious equal
opportunity language. For example, the Army’s instructions to a mandatory
retirement board challenged in Berkley v. United States stated:
Your evaluation of minority and women officers must clearly afford them fair
and equitable consideration . . . . In your evaluation of the records of minority
and women officers, you should be particularly sensitive to the possibility that
past individual and societal attitudes, and in some instances utilization of
policies or practices, may have placed these officers at a disadvantage from a
246
total career perspective.

With regard to the language, the court noted that the “mere mention of a race or
247
gender” did not trigger heightened scrutiny, but that the “government action
248
must bestow a benefit or a burden” based on the contested classification. In
Berkley, the Court of Federal Claims held that “the government’s instructions did
not operate to benefit or burden a race or gender, but rather helped to ensure ‘a
fair appraisal of a candidate’s value so that the overall best qualified and
249
suitable candidates may be selected.’”
If Berkley had ended there, we might be talking about a ruling in direct
confrontation with Saunders. The Berkley decision was, however, appealed and
the appellate court determined that the language to the retirement board did
involve a racial and gender classification, by directing the board to consider a
past history of discrimination that might place white male officers at a
250
disadvantage. The court vacated and remanded the case to the Court of
Federal Claims, for the court to apply strict scrutiny to the language rather than
251
the previously applied rational basis analysis. The case settled while on

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
Baker v.

48 Fed. Cl. 361 (2000).
191 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D.D.C. 2002).
Berkley, 48 Fed. Cl. at 365.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 369–70.
Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (quoting Berkley, 48 Fed. Cl. at 371).
Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1091. Another military retirement case was subject to a substantially similar process. In
United States, 127 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the Court of Federal Claims granted summary
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252

remand, so there was no opportunity for another court to decide whether the
Army’s reasoning would survive strict scrutiny. As analyzed in Saunders, it did
not. Still, Saunders was not a Supreme Court pronouncement, and there is room
for another circuit to interpret a Service’s equal opportunity language to be nondiscriminatory. As it is very unlikely the military would attempt to resurrect the
very language rejected in Saunders, the precise contours of constitutionally
viable, but more explicit, equal opportunity statements are unknown. Yet, if the
Services do not attempt to craft them, the end result of the Saunders strict
scrutiny analysis continuing to exist without opposition is that the decision “will
cause enormous mischief by potentially invalidating virtually any governmental
directive that cautions against the perpetuation of racial discrimination against
253
minorities and gender discrimination against women.”
B. Crafting an Identity-Conscious Solution Under Saunders
Rather than argue against the Saunders decision, some space exists to argue
that a more effective race- or gender-conscious promotion policy could be used
that would pass scrutiny under that case. The court in Saunders distinguished
itself from the Court of Federal Claims in Berkley based upon the fact that
Saunders’ promotion boards also included language that set specific goals for
the selection of minorities and women, and an instruction for the board to
explain those instances where minority groups fared less well than the overall
254
group. Saunders also indicated that the Court of Federal Claims, in Christian v.
255
United States, rejected language identical to the language in Saunders.
It can be argued that, without the minority officer selection goals and re256
voting language, Saunders could have been decided differently. Additionally,
the court determined that the Army had not survived strict scrutiny because it
was not persuaded by the data the Army presented on officer promotions. As
257
discussed above, the court was skeptical of the period of review of the
proffered study, the fact that in some years black officers outperformed Whites
in junior officer promotions, and the fact that the data were for all officers rather
than just Army JAGs. Ultimately, the court remarked on the data, “the Court is
not suggesting that black officers were treated equally . . . [r]ather, the Court is

judgment in a case involving a Selective Early Retirement Board using very similar language to that
in Berkley. The same appellate court in Berkley vacated and remanded the case for a ruling consistent
with the higher scrutiny involved in cases where the government uses gender and race
classifications.
252. Berkley v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 675 (2004).
253. Berkley, 287 F.3d at 1091 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
254. Saunders, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 127. Given the decision of the Court of Appeals, this distinction
was no longer necessary. Berkley, 287 F.3d at 1091.
255. 46 Fed. Cl. 793, 793 (2000).
256. For this to be so, a different court would have to: (1) agree with the initial assessment in
Berkley, that no race/gender classification was involved in the language; (2) come to different strict
scrutiny determination than the court in Saunders—a decision the Court of Claims avoided when
Berkley settled; or (3) determine that the deference to the military requires the court make no
determination—an option proposed by the dissent in Berkley and considered in Part IV.C, infra.
257. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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finding these statistics are insufficient to demonstrate the opposite conclusion
258
(that black officers are discriminated against).” Given the promotion board
data presented above, we might begin to formulate a claim that, for some Corps
and in certain services, the statistics show a different trend. Using the Navy JAG
Corps as an example, however, reveals one problem with the Saunders highly
specific discrimination data requirement. In the boards discussed in this Article,
the sample sizes of eligible men and women of color were relatively small. In
career fields such as this, it may be that due to such small sample sizes, that even
where disparate selection numbers exist, you may not be able to prove empirical
259
significance. In the least, statistics for a larger number of years would be
needed, in addition to creating separate data for race and gender combined.
Following Saunders, in the strictest sense, then, would require a massive
empirical undertaking—looking at minority success at every rank, in each
service, for each career field.
Beyond supplying the data that the court indicated would be necessary to
prove current discrimination, following Saunders would still leave us in a world
where the government would need to survive strict scrutiny by advancing a
compelling interest that is narrowly tailored to the purpose of remedying
discrimination. While the question of narrow tailoring will depend on the
precise language of any promotion instructions and whether the Service uses
minority candidate selection goals and re-voting, the compelling interest can be
260
the very diversity rationale the Court accepted in Grutter. In essence, one could
argue that the Grutter Court endorsed the contention that officer diversity was
261
paramount to national security. It then determined that, if diversity was a
compelling interest for the purpose of military accessions, then the same could
be true in education. The final piece of the argument then is to allege that not
only is diversity critical at the officer entry point, but that it is equally important
that military promotions also use some race- and gender-conscious
262
considerations. Given the strong endorsement of military diversity in Grutter,
it would be difficult for the court to reject this formulation of a compelling
interest standard. The devil will, of course, be in the details of the selected raceand gender-conscious promotion board language—that, however, is one
important step beyond the current state of military policy.

258. Id. at 133 n.42 (alteration added).
259. See supra notes 218, 226, 230 (presenting the small sample sizes of people of color being
considered for promotion to commander in the Navy JAG Corps over a four year period).
260. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
261. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. This has been referred to as an occupational
need argument, an argument that would be rejected under Title VII, for most occupations other than
the military. See Brian W. Leach, Race as Mission Critical: The Occupational Need Rationale in Military
Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE. L.J. 1093, 1094 (2004).
262. In the same vein as the national security interest raised in Grutter, I would suggest that raceand gender-conscious promotions are necessary to ensure effective leadership, mentoring, and
retention within a diverse military. At least one other commenter has suggested using the notion of
maintaining combat readiness as the compelling interest that one could narrowly tailor identityconscious promotion considerations to further. See Cook, supra note 110, at 190–92.
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C. Equal Opportunity, the Courts, and Military Deference
One way to attack the strength of the Saunders decision is to argue that it
never should have been substantively decided in the first place. The federal
courts have shown a “special deference” to military decisions with regard to
263
constitutional challenges to military policies and procedures. This deference
could be framed as a form of non-interference required as a result of showing
264
respect for the political branch. In many cases, this complete deference has
265
involved challenges to the decision to deploy military force. More routinely,
the deference is defined as a requirement that courts give the military greater
266
latitude with regard to the application of constitutional protections. Three
well-known cases involving ethnicity, race, and gender that have applied this
267
268
variety of deference are Goldman v. Weinberger, Rostker v. Goldberg, and
269
Chappell v. Wallace. In Goldman, the Court rejected a First Amendment
complaint from a Jewish service member who was discharged over his refusal to
remove his yarmulke while in uniform. In response to the claim, the Court
determined that its review of a constitutional challenge to a military regulation
“is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations
270
designed for civilian society.”
In Rostker, the Court rejected an Equal Protection challenge to the
congressional decision barring women from registration for the selective
271
service.
While the Court applied heightened scrutiny review to the
government’s decision involving a gender classification, it decided whether
Congress’s rationale for the policy met the important government objective
standard by taking into account the uniqueness of the military. The majority
opined that the military was an environment “governed by separate discipline
272
from that of the civilian,” and where Congress needed permission to legislate
273
“with greater breadth and with greater flexibility . . . .” After Rostker, the Court

263. See CRS REPORT, supra note 86, at CRS-12.
264. In essence, this deference would result in the Court finding the complaints to involve
nonjusticiable political questions. See Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (determining that, where
cases involve executive actions that are of a political nature, “the opinion of the executive is
conclusive”); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (1979) (finding a case within the area of foreign
policy with military implications to be “a nonjusticiable political dispute that should be left for
resolution by the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government”).
265. See, e.g., Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990) (dismissing a challenge to the U.S.
involvement in Desert Storm); Doe v. Bush, 322 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 2003) (dismissing a challenge to the
U.S. involvement in current hostilities in Iraq).
266. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding Air Force limits on the circulation
of political petitions); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding limits on protests and political
speeches).
267. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
268. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
269. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
270. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
271. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67.
272. Id. at 71.
273. Id. at 66 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)).
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decided another Equal Protection case, this time involving race. In Chappell, a
Navy enlisted member brought an action alleging that a superior officer
engaged in racial discrimination with regard to duty assignments and
performance evaluations. In rejecting the extension of this Bivens-style claim to
275
military members, the Court cited both Congress’s Article I authority to
276
“provide and maintain a navy” and the fact that a system to resolve
277
complaints against superiors was already in effect within the Navy.
Ultimately, referring to the military’s “broad power to deal with its own
278
personnel,” the Court held that military members could not recover damages
279
from a superior based upon alleged constitutional violations.
Since the military’s equal opportunity policies are involved in the
promotion cases, the military could conceivably argue that these personnel
policies exist in regulations that are prescribed by the President and Congress,
pursuant to their constitutional powers under Article II and Article I of the
280
Constitution, respectively. As such, one could broadly assert that the political
281
question doctrine mandates that the Court not review a complaint. This
position against any review seems untenable, especially given that the Justices
282
have typically claimed a right to judicial review, and courts have proscribed
283
specific parameters for the justiciability of cases involving military policies.
Moreover, the Court has actually reviewed previous Equal Protection challenges
to military regulations.
The deference claim in the case of promotion precept language would once
again involve an Equal Protection challenge, this time based upon race and
gender. Even though the Court showed deference to a gender-based distinction
in Rostker, it rejected extending protections for race-based constitutional
violations in Chappell. One could argue, however, that Chappell involved

274. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
275. Such claims for constitutional violations had been authorized for federal civilian employees
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
276. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302.
277. Id. at 303.
278. Id. at 305 (citing Chief Justice Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 181, 187 (1962)).
279. Id.
280. Kathryn Abrams made this claim with regard to the power of the President and Congress to
create regulations for including gays and lesbians. See Abrams, supra note 76, at 234 n.56.
281. See supra notes 264–265 and accompanying text; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(listing several instances where the Court should refrain from reviewing cases, including where the
matter is committed to a constituent branch).
282. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 515 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“And, while
we have hesitated . . . to strike down restrictions on individual liberties which could be reasonably
justified as necessary to the military’s vital function, . . . we have never abdicated our obligation on
judicial review.” (citations omitted)).
283. See Murphy v. United States, 993 F.2d 871, 873 (1993) (holding that military personnel
decisions should only be reviewed where there are limits placed on the Secretary’s discretion and
Congress has provided standards to measure the Secretary’s decision-making); Adkins v. United
States, 68 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the court may review military decisions pertaining
to procedural issues).
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members seeking rights enforcement. In contrast, the Saunders-like cause of
action is more akin to the Goldman case, where the Court refused to disrupt a
military policy. A challenge to an affirmative policy premised upon an identity
difference would look much more like the Rostker case. There, the Court
considered the military’s uniqueness when applying heightened scrutiny and
upholding a gender-based difference. Still, based on the previous cases, it is
unclear how the Court would respond to what is essentially a military
affirmative action program, rather than a case involving racial discrimination
claims. As the Saunders decision may reflect, with regard to litigating equal
protection, the courts may be less concerned with military uniqueness and more
concerned with societal claims of reverse discrimination.
Since the Chappell and Rostker rulings, we have seen both the significant
284
demise of federal affirmative action programs and that lower courts are
285
uninterested in showing deference. Specifically, in Berkley, the appellate court
determined: “We adhere to the policy of giving deference to the military for
matters involving ‘discipline, morale, composition and the like.’ Such deference,
however, does not prevent or preclude our review of the Instruction in this case
286
in light of constitutional equal protection claims raised.” Essentially, then, the
court’s comment indicated that it would not defer in reviewing the case. The
court did allow the Court of Federal Claims to determine, on remand, “what
effect, if any, deference to the military would have on the judicial application of
287
strict scrutiny.” Additionally, while it is an older case based upon outdated
288
statutes and Equal Protection analysis, Schlesinger v. Ballard might also be
somewhat instructive. Ballard, a male naval officer twice passed over for
promotion, challenged statutes that allowed female officers a greater number of
years of service prior to mandatory discharge for failing to promote. In
upholding the statutes, the Court concluded that the laws were not
unconstitutional because they were not premised upon “overbroad
289
generalizations.” Instead, the Court determined that the statutes were based
upon “the demonstrable fact that male and female line officers in the Navy are
290
not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional service.”
The cases involved personnel statutes rather than regulations and applied only
rational basis review, but at bottom, the Court was willing to allow Congress to
determine how best to manage the Armed Forces’ promotion and discharge
policies.
The foregoing cases seem to suggest then that a federal court, including the

284. See supra note 53 (discussing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and
Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)).
285. See discussion supra Parts II.C, IV.A, IV.B (discussing the Christian, Berkley, and Saunders
cases).
286. Berkley, 287 F.3d at 1091 (citing Holley v. United States, 124 F.3d 1462, 1465-66 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
287. Id.
288. 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding statutory scheme giving women naval officers more time
than men to be promoted prior to discharge for lack of promotion).
289. Id. at 507.
290. Id. at 508. Notably, the Court premised its decision on rejecting a gender success narrative.
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Supreme Court, could extend the various services greater latitude with regard to
291
their chosen selection board equal opportunity policies. Given that the Services
still maintain affirmative action programs for accession, the Supreme Court’s
292
positive comment on diversity and the military in Grutter, and the tenuous
promotion prospects for some, it is at least advisable to attempt some more
robust language. Such language would resurrect the pre-Saunders standards,
which noticed the effect of past discrimination and the more subtle nature of
293
current discrimination. And if we dare to dream big, perhaps we might even
begin to explore and explain the special problems of persons inhabiting multiple
identities.
CONCLUSION
The difference between being selected and passed over for promotion in
the military is often razor thin. A uniform measure of excellent performance is
typically required to be seriously considered by a promotion board—certainly
by a board promoting members to the rank of senior officer. For boards where
minorities and women do not perform particularly well, it could be that the
boards’ decisions involve no bias at all. Such a statement would be consistent
with the fact that the boards analyzed herein show a selection rate for women
often consistent with that of men. Or, the results might be said by some to be
294
completely discriminatory. While such a statement may be difficult to prove, it
would not be beyond the pale given the disparate selection numbers for race in a
number of selection boards reviewed in this Article. The truth of promotions
and identity in the military, however, probably lies between these extreme
statements and might be best explained in the results for women color—a group
at the intersection of gender parity and race disadvantage, and whose success is
not closely monitored by the institution.
In a system where we do not carefully annotate who is negatively affected
by subjective selection processes—where supposed statements of equal
opportunity actually dissuade frank discussions of race and gender, and where
these conditions remain unnoticed due to the strength of an organization’s
“integration success stories”—it is difficult to decipher precisely what work is
being done by identity. From the disparate promotion results presented in this
Article, however, it seems fair to suggest that instructing women and minorities
to continue to invest in assimilative conduct is unhelpful. Only by using
structural tools of an identity-conscious nature can one create an environment
that honestly engages the hard work of identifying what it means to be at a

291. In Miller v. Dep’t of the Navy, 383 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d and remanded, 476 F.3d
936, 937–38 (D.C. Cir. 2007), discussed in supra notes 171–181 and accompanying text, the court even
claimed that it should be “unusually deferential” when applying standards of review to military
personnel decisions. Miller, 476 F.3d at 938.
292. See supra notes 50–52.
293. Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 177, at 1292–93.
294. This charge might extend either to the board members or to the system of assignments and
evaluations that may yield different results across race.
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disadvantage “because of” race, gender, or other ascriptive markers. An
organization that does not engage this work should not continue to benefit from
its reputation as a model for effective integration. This type of complacency
should be viewed as complicity, as blindness to the noticeable effects of identity
296
difference should be understood to be willful. Ultimately, the military’s
current approach leaves minority service members, especially those straddling
multiple identities, as the only parties burdened with managing this task of
ameliorating difference. This is unfair. For as much as it is understood that all
service requires sacrifice, honor, fidelity, and duty, it is not just to require
anyone to be that “brave.”

295. This is the non-applicable-to-the-military, but relevant language of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (making it illegal for employers “to discriminate
against any individual with respect to . . . privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin” (emphasis added)).
296. I thank Prof. D. Marvin Jones, who in conversations and through the richness of his book,
RACE, SEX, AND SUSPICION: THE MYTH OF THE BLACK MALE (2005), challenged me to distinguish
between unconscious bias and what may be willful blindness.

